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The fundamental goal of this thesis is to build optimization frameworks
for decision makers with unknown preferences under different conditions.
Specifically, we firstly propose a new stochastic dominance relationship in
which utility functions are weighted against a reference utility for risk-
averse decision makers. The necessary and sufficient conditions are pro-
vided. We then formulate our proposed weighted almost stochastic domi-
nance in our optimization framework by convex function interpolation and
subgradient characterization. We will resort to linear programming and its
duality as our technique.
We next extend the concept of almost stochastic dominance to random
variables with normal and log-normal probability distributions, and ap-
ply the results to mean-variance analysis and Maximum Geometric Mean
(MGM) strategy. We show how we could calculate the amount of domi-
nance by which a normally or log-normally distributed reward dominates
another by almost stochastic dominance and determine the set of utility
functions such that one prospect dominates the other.
We then provide a more general optimization framework that considers
the following four factors: multivariate prospects, preference uncertainty,
computational tractability, and target-oriented measure. Two approaches,
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Comparing random variables, or more precisely comparing distributions,
has been fundamental and of great interest as it is prevalent in real life.
For instance, we may encounter situations to choose between investments,
or to compare Monte Carlo simulation results. Some of the early works on
this topic include Mann and Whitney (1947), who gave a test of whether a
random variable is stochastically larger than another; and Lehmann (1955),
who made a comparison of several definitions of ordered sets of distribu-
tions. Their discussion laid the foundation of the subsequent approaches
for comparing random variables.
One common way of ranking random variables is the notion of stochas-
tic dominance (SD). SD is a form of stochastic ordering. The term is used
in decision analysis to refer to situations where one prospect (a probability
distribution over possible outcomes) can be considered stochastically su-
perior over another based on preferences regarding outcomes (Levy, 1992).
A preference might be a simple ranking of outcomes from most to least
favored, or it might also employ a value measure such as different kinds of
utility functions. As more assumptions such as risk aversion are needed,
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higher order SD is taken into account.
The concept of SD was first introduced in a test of whether one of
two random variables is stochastically larger than the other. However,
traditional SD rules may not reveal dominance between two options even
though there is an obvious preference for one of these options because the
corresponding utility sets contain “extreme” utility functions that do not
correspond to decision makers observed in practice. One example would
be that most “reasonable” investors would prefer a higher proportion of
stocks as the investment horizon increases (Leshno and Levy, 2002). An
“extreme” utility function could be in the form of not assigning a relatively
high marginal utility to very low values or a relatively low marginal utility
to large values. These relationships are thus quite restrictive and leads to
challenges for use in practice. In optimization problems, they may even
make the problem infeasible.
This leads to various paradoxes in decision making and the introduc-
tion of almost SD (ASD) by Leshno and Levy (2002). ASD resolves this
difficulty by giving relaxations of traditional stochastic dominance rela-
tionships. Several notions of ASD that are more flexible than conventional
SD have been proposed. The idea is to choose a strict subset of the corre-
sponding utility set of conventional SD that gives rise to a weaker stochastic
dominance relation but that only includes realistic utility functions. ASD
is an ordering that reveals the preferences among most decision makers so
that the extreme cases of decision makers, which are theoretically possible
but rarely observed in practice, could be left out.
Even though ASD possesses several advantages over traditional SD, it
still does not reveal the preferences observed in the St. Petersburg para-
dox. Tan (2015) generalizes the conditions of ASD by introducing a weight
function to address this issue. The proposed the necessary and sufficient
conditions for WASD imply the unanimous preference by all individuals
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with non-decreasing utility functions whose marginal utilities are bounded
by a reference marginal utility.
It can be noted that along the development of SD, its definition has been
tailored to be more practical. Meanwhile, we note that individuals have
been observed to be risk-averse under multiple settings (Brenner, 2015;
Rieger et al., 2015). People may wish to check for unanimous preference
across all non-extreme and non-decreasing concave utility functions, rather
than across all non-extreme and non-decreasing utility functions, when
screening a set of feasible acts. Therefore, the prevalence of risk-aversion
among decision makers makes considering concavity restrictions in WASD
an interesting topic.
The concept of SD can also be applied between specific common prob-
ability distributions. The normal distribution is common and well-known.
In particular, the central limit theorem states that the arithmetic mean of
a large enough number of independently and identically distributed ran-
dom variables will be approximately normally distributed, regardless of
the underlying distribution of random variables. This attractive property
makes the normal distribution important and useful. For instance, the
connection between SD and the normal distribution gives insights in the
mean-variance efficient frontier analysis. The log-normal distribution is
popular in describing natural phenomena as well. In particular, many nat-
ural growth processes are in the form of the accumulation of multiple small
percentage changes, which become additive on a log scale. For example,
in the world of finance, the log-normal property of stock prices is among
the assumptions of the famous Black–Scholes model. Therefore, linking SD
with these specific distributions has practical advantages.
Since SD plays an important role in the decision analysis literature, it is
highly considered in the stochastic optimization models regarding decision
making and this connection has already been made. For example, we could
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employ a parametric representation of the set of utility functions used to
define the dominance constraint (Dentcheva and Ruszczyn´ski, 2003; Hu
et al., 2012; Haskell and Jain, 2013). SD has appeared in the dominance
constraints of convex optimization problems. Multi-variate SD constraints
are developed along a similar fashion as well. Under this parametric repre-
sentation, increasing concave utility functions show up in the dual problems
as the Lagrange multipliers of SD constraints. From another perspective,
representations of SD constraints based on linear and integer programming
are developed in which the entire family of increasing concave functions is
represented (Luedtke, 2008; Armbruster and Luedtke, 2015).
Rather than comparing random variables, one might be interested in
evaluating each random variable independently. This could be done via risk
measures which can take into account the risk preferences of the decision
maker. We propose that the following four considerations be taken into
account for a general risk measure optimization framework:
Multivariate prospects. A general risk-aware optimization framework
should be able to handle multiple criteria. Many key problems in stochas-
tic optimization have multiple criteria. For instance, a portfolio in the
financial market whose assets cannot be aggregated may be deemed a mul-
tivariate case. An effective risk management paradigm must be able to
handle multivariate random prospects.
Preference uncertainty. Risk-averse preference is of great interest due
to its prevalence across decision makers. However, risk-seeking preferences
(or a mixture of them) have also been observed. Even for risk-averse de-
cision makers, the extent of their aversion towards risk also differs. In
particular, it is difficult for a decision maker to precisely express his risk
preferences. Hence, a practical risk management scheme must be robust
against uncertainty in risk preferences.
Computational tractability. This is a major consideration in the related
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literature on robust optimization as many problems in practice involve a
large number of variables and constraints. Therefore a risk-aware frame-
work should be computationally tractable. Ideally, it should be evaluated
with convex optimization techniques.
Target-oriented measure. In real life, a decision maker may evaluate the
fitness of his decision with respect to a target or goal. Under this context,
risk may be interpreted as failure to meet the desired targets or goals. A
comprehensive optimization framework should be able to take targets into
account.
Next, we discuss the main research objectives.
1.2 Research objectives
While there is a rich literature on stochastic dominance relationships as well
as optimization models based on it, there remain areas of improvements.
Specifically, we address the following questions:
1. Is there a SD relationship for which the decision maker is known to
be risk-averse and whose utility is approximately known? We aim
to reveal the unanimous preference between prospects by all risk-
averse decision makers whose utility functions are unknown but not
deviating too much from a reference utility (e.g. constant relative
risk aversion utility). As mentioned, risk aversion is often observed
in practice. Although the utility of the decision maker is unknown,
it could often be approximated via a series of lottery comparisons.
Surprisingly, SD for such settings is rarely discussed.
2. Can we develop an optimization framework that introduces a set
of constraints for this new proposed SD relationship? This model
could provide a decision making scheme for all risk-averse decision
makers whose utility functions are unknown but remain in some cer-
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tain range. Specifically, under reasonable assumptions, this frame-
work is computationally tractable by employing convex optimization
techniques with a non-parametric representation of dominance con-
straints.
3. How can we apply the concept of ASD to specific probability distribu-
tions, e.g. the log-normal distribution? Understanding the conditions
for ASD between specific distributions allows us to study the pref-
erences of individuals in settings where these distributions are valid.
For example, there is both theoretic and empirical evidence that, un-
der a sufficiently long horizon, investment returns are approximately
log-normal distributed.
4. Based on the optimization framework of SD relationship, can we gen-
eralize it to one that considers the four considerations mentioned
in the previous section? With this model, the value of the target-
oriented risk measure given multivariate prospects by decision mak-
ers who have convex risk measures, which has multiple applications
in practice, could be determined.
As the decision making process is becoming more sophisticated, a broad
range of requirements should be taken into account. The purpose of this
thesis is to propose a new SD condition which can guide decision making
as well as improve existing optimization formulations. We then apply the
concept of ASD to specific probability distributions. Lastly, we provide a
unifying framework that satisfies all four of our considerations just outlined.
We combine the work on different perspectives of optimization and SD.
Previously the two different bodies of literature were, for the most part,
restricted to different communities. However, we feel that there exists a
natural link between them and a combination of these two fields is promis-
ing. Although the study here is theoretically oriented, these models indeed
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provide some significant insights in real life, as we will illustrate in this
thesis. For instance, we are interested in a portfolio optimization prob-
lem where we aim to maximize the expected return such that the portfolio
stochastically dominates a given benchmark.
After the work in this dissertation, the following contributions can be
summarized.
1. We have proposed a new SD relationship in which utility functions
are weighted against a reference utility for risk-averse decision makers
and an optimization framework that introduces a set of constraints
of the above mentioned SD relationship. In particular, new SD rela-
tionship addresses the gap of SD for risk-averse decision makers. The
optimization framework here could address the limitation in conven-
tional SD optimization approaches when the preference information
is incomplete. In this way, we could avoid to make decision makers
to evaluating a series of pairwise comparisons between lotteries men-
tioned in Armbruster and Delage (2015). We use a utility range to
describe preference that does not deviate too much from a popular
pattern.
2. We have extended the concept of ASD to log-normal probability
distributions and applied the results to mean-variance analysis and
MGM strategy. We note that though MGM portfolio could maxi-
mize expected return, but does not maximize expected utility across
all nondecreasing utility functions, even in the long run. Levy (2016)
attempted to address this concern but under some conditions. By
applying the concept of ASD to log-normal probability distributions,
we could relax some of these conditions to make it more reasonable.
3. We provided a more general optimization framework that considers
the four considerations we have mentioned. This framework deals
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with the multivariate case and target-based measure that are not con-
sidered in Armbruster and Delage (2015). It also addresses the com-
putational tractability that is not focused in Brown and Sim (2009)
and Brown et al. (2012). Specifically, this is done by subgradient
characterization and acceptance set approach.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents
the notation and some critical concepts that are used in this dissertation.
Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive literature review of related previous
work. Chapter 4 proposes a new stochastic dominance relationship and the
corresponding optimization model. Chapter 5 discusses the application of
the concept of ASD to some well-known probability distributions, namely
the log-normal distribution. Chapter 6 proposes a unifying optimization
framework with good properties. Chapter 7 concludes the whole thesis and




In this chapter, we introduce basic notation and assumptions, as well as
some critical concepts and definitions that are used in this dissertation.
We list them here to make the dissertation self-contained and convenient
to check.
2.1 Notation and assumptions
Let Ω denote a sample space with elements ω ∈ Ω, B a Borel σ-algebra
defined on Ω, and P a probability measure defined on (Ω, B). Hence we
have introduced a probability space (Ω, B, P ).
Next, we define Ln to be the linear space of essentially bounded B-
measurable mappings X : Ω→ Rn for n ≥ 1. When n = 1, it corresponds
to the univariate random variable case where we write it as L. When
n ≥ 2, we write Ln to denote the space of multivariate prospects. For any
X, Y ∈ Ln, we write X ≤ Y when X (ω) ≤ Y (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
Let Z ⊂ Rm be a decision set determined by decision makers. Let G :
Z → Ln be a random-variable-valued mapping with realizations denoted
by [G (z)] (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. Therefore, the mapping G (z) inherits the
randomness in the underlying decision-making problem and is a random
variable. We introduce a random variable Y ∈ Ln to be the benchmark of
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G(z).
For any compact set X ⊂ R, let C (X ) be the space of continuous
functions on X in the supremum norm,
‖u‖C(X ) , sup
x∈X
|u (x) |.
In addition, we let C1 (X ) denote the set of continuously differentiable func-
tions in C (X ) and C2 (X ) denote the set of continuously second-order dif-
ferentiable functions in C (X ).
Let f ∈ C(Z) be a deterministic objective function on the decision
set and m : X → R be a nonnegative weight function which bounds the
marginal utilities of risk-averse decision makers.
Let H be a closed convex cone in Rn such that Rn+ ⊂ H and H 6= Rn
with an induced partial ordering by X  0 if and only if X ∈ H almost
surely.
We now make some assumptions in our decision-making optimization
problem for technical convenience.
A1 Z is closed and convex.
A2 G : Z → Ln is convex.
A3 f is concave.
Therefore, [G (z)] (ω) : Z → Rn is convex in z ∈ Z for P -almost all
ω ∈ Ω. This key convexity assumption ensures that convex optimization
techniques could be used. We want to choose z ∈ Z so that G (z) has a
favorable distribution in some sense. To evaluate the distribution of G (z),
we use mappings ρ : Ln → R which we refer to as “risk functions” in line
with Ruszczyn´ski and Shapiro (2006).
We make the following key assumption on the underlying sample space:
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A4 Ω is finite. Random variables on (Ω, B, P ) have bounded and finite
support in the interval X , [xmin, xmax].
For later use, we introduce a discretization Θ , {θ1, . . . , θK} ⊂ X of X
where θ1 < θ2 < · · · < θK , θ1 = xmin, and θK = xmax. Note that the length
of the longest subinterval of Θ, maxi=2,...,K (θi − θi−1), is a measure of the
granularity of Θ. We make an additional technical assumption regarding
the support of the benchmark Y :
A5 suppY is finite and suppY ⊂ Θ.
We can meet this assumption by construction since the benchmark Y
is a user input. The discretization Θ is also a user input, and it can be
constructed a priori to include the support of Y .
We will make further assumptions on the weight function m.
A6 m is Lipschitz continuous with constant L.
This is a relatively strong form of function uniform continuity. Imagine
a double cone with slopes of L and −L. When the vertex moves along the
function curve, the curve will always remain entirely outside the cone.
A7 ConeH that defines the acceptance setA (containing Ln(H)) possesses
the substitutability property:
−ei + αe1 ∈ H, ei − βe1 ∈ H, α, β > 0, i = 2, ..., n,
where ei denotes the unit vector with i
th component 1.
This means that any entry other than the one in the first position, can
be substituted or compensated by some position in the first entry. More
precisely, it states that the unitary prices of the assets for i ≥ 2 in terms of
the first asset must be bounded. We give an example of H in two-dimension
Euclidean space as following.
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Example 2.1.1. Let H = {(x1, x2) ∈ R2 : 5x1 + x2 ≥ 0, 15x1 + x2 ≥
0}. Then the linear space of essentially bounded H-valued B-measurable
random vectors Ln(H) can be used to define the acceptance set A in two-
dimension case.
2.2 Definitions of concepts
In this section, we will start with stochastic dominance and its related con-
cepts. This is the key idea in revealing the dominance relationship between
prospects. Definitions as well as the corresponding sufficient and necessary
conditions will be discussed. Different types of stochastic dominance are
associated with different categories of utility functions of decision makers.
We could apply these concepts to different decision makers accordingly. In
addition, we will also introduce some other concepts that used in the opti-
mization frameworks and the application of stochastic dominance, such as
robust certainty equivalent, maximum geometric mean (MGM) portfolio,
etc.
2.2.1 Stochastic dominance
Let FX and FY denote the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of random
variables X and Y , respectively. Let S1 denote the set of outcomes where
FX > FY (i.e., S1 = {t : FX(t) > FY (t)}).
We denote a collection of utility functions U ⊂ C (X ) the set of all non-
decreasing utility functions, and Uicv ⊂ C (X ) the set of all non-decreasing
convex utility functions.
The theory of SD was developed by Hadar and Russell (1969), Hanoch
and Levy (1969), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). They provide the defini-
tion as well as the criteria rules and proof. We begin with the following
definition of conventional SD:
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Definition 2.2.1 (Stochastic dominance). For X, Y ∈ L, X stochastically
dominates Y , denoted by X U Y , if and only if E[u(X)] ≥ E[u(Y )] for
all u in U .
Conventional SD is defined via the expected utility theory here. We
know that the set of utility functions such that X is clearly preferred over
Y is set of all non-decreasing utility functions. We can also conclude the
dominance relationship from another perspective, which leads to the intro-
duction of its sufficient and necessary condition.
It can be showed that X stochastically dominates Y if and only if
FX(t) ≤ FY (t)∀t, and there exists a t0 such that the strict inequality
FX(t0) < FY (t0) holds. In particular, it can be noted that the cdf curve of
X cannot go above that of Y everywhere. The conditions from both the
expected utility theory and the cdf relationship are equivalent in showing
the dominance relationship between X and Y .
We then introduce the following defition of ASD:
Definition 2.2.2 (Almost stochastic dominance). For X, Y ∈ L and 0 <
ε < 0.5, X dominates Y with ε-ASD, denoted by X U∗(ε) Y , if and only
if E[u(X)] ≥ E[u(Y )] for all u in U∗(ε), where:
U∗(ε) =
{









i.e. when the expected utility of X is greater than or equal to the expected
utility of Y for all u ∈ U∗(ε).
In particular, U∗(ε) is the set of all differentiable nondecreasing utility





For example, all utility functions whose marginal utility is no greater than
2 and no lesser than 0.5 are contained in U∗(0.2).
Leshno and Levy (2002) showed that for 0 < ε < 0.5, X dominates Y
13





−∞ |FX(t)− FY (t)|dt
. (2.1)
In particular, note that the denominator in Equation (2.1) corresponds to
the total area between FX and FY while the numerator in Equation (2.1)
corresponds to the area between FX and FY where FX > FY . Comparing
to the conventional SD case where the cdf curve of X cannot go above that
of Y everywhere, it is allowed to violate this rule if the violation is within
some predetermined level. As shown in Figure 2.1, area A1 is the violation
area which is the numerator in Equation (2.1), and A1 + A2 is the total
area which is the denominator. Therefore, X dominates Y with ε-ASD if
and only if the ratio of the two areas is less than the predetermined level
ε.
Fig. 2.1. Almost stochastic dominance.
Definition 2.2.3 (Weighted almost stochastic dominance). For X, Y ∈ L
and 0 < ε < 0.5, X dominates Y with (m, ε)-WASD, denoted by X U∗(m,ε)
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Y , if and only if E[u(X)] ≥ E[u(Y )] for all u in U∗(m, ε), where:
U∗(m, ε) =
{















U∗(m, ε) is the set of all differentiable nondecreasing utility functions





In particular, m(t) denotes a nonnegative function that describes the marginal
utility of some canonical utility function, which U∗(m, ε) is constructed
around.
Tan (2015) showed that for 0 < ε < 0.5, X dominates Y with (m, ε)-







Equation (2.2) is very similar to Equation (2.1) other than a weight function
is required in the integral. Note that WASD relationship becomes ASD if
the weight function is a constant. Thus ASD is a special case of WASD.
2.2.2 Other concepts
Armbruster and Delage (2015) proposes the concept of robust certainty
equivalent which removes the need of a benchmark by which the desired
prospect depending on our decisions should dominate.
The certainty equivalent is the amount for sure such that one would be
indifferent between it and the random prospect:
Definition 2.2.4 (Robust Certainty Equivalent (RCE)). The Robust Cer-
tainty Equivalent of a prospect X is:
Cu [X] , sup {s : u (s) ≤ E [u (X)]} , ∀u ∈ U .
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This can be formulated as an RCE maximization problem which is
tractable.
Maximum geometric mean (MGM) strategy has been proposed for in-
vestors with a sufficiently long horizon (see Kelly (1956), Breiman (1960),
and Markowitz (1976)). It aims for maximal terminal wealth by investing
in each period based on the logarithm of returns.
Definition 2.2.5 (Maximum Geometric Mean (MGM) Portfolio). For a
long investment horizon with multi-period, MGM portfolio is a portfolio
investing in each period aiming to maximize
E[log(1 +Rt)],
where Rt represents the one-period portfolio rate of return. Rt’s are inde-
pendently and identically distributed and have finite mean and variance.
In particular, it follows from the law of large numbers that a MGM





This chapter presents a survey of literature pertinent to studies on stochas-
tic dominance (SD) as well as risk measures. Related optimization frame-
works, especially classical linear programming, will also be discussed. In
particular, we look into how the concept of SD and risk measures can be
adopted within various optimization frameworks.
3.1 Stochastic dominance (SD)
In this section, we start with the development of stochastic dominance
(SD). In particular, we review how the concept of SD has evolved. In addi-
tion to the review on the development of SD, previous studies that have at-
tempted to develop SD-related optimization framework are also discussed.
3.1.1 Development of SD
As more complicated and practical needs are considered in decision making,
the concept of SD has evolved along the way. The development of SD can
be broadly broken down as follows: Conventional SD and Almost SD.
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Conventional SD
In 1932, Karamata proved a theorem, i.e. Karamata’s inequality, which
is very similar to second-order SD (SSD). Then the concept of SD was
introduced in mathematics by Mann and Whitney (1947) and Lehmann
(1955). Mann and Whitney gave a test of whether a random variable is
stochastically larger than another. A statistic depending on the relative
ranks of the two random variables is proposed for testing the hypothesis
that the continuous cumulative distribution functions of the two are equiv-
alent. Lehmann made a comparison of several definitions of ordered sets
of distributions. These definitions attempt to make precise the intuitive
notion that large values of the parameter which labels the distributions go
together with large values of the random variables themselves.
Originating from the majorization theory, the theory of SD and its many
theoretical and empirical extensions in economics and finance were formally
developed when four papers were independently published by Hadar and
Russell (1969), Hanoch and Levy (1969), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)
and Whitmore (1970). The first three papers provide the definition of the
first-order SD (FSD) and second-order SD (SSD) as well as the criteria
rules and proof. The fourth paper develops those for the third-order SD
(TSD). The SD rules can easily be extended to higher orders, i.e. nth-
order SD. Since then, hundreds of papers have been written on the topic,
as highlighted in a survey paper by Levy (1992). Levy pointed out the
following four main areas of development:
1. further theoretical development;
2. application of SD rules to empirical data;
3. application of SD rules to other economic and financial issues;
4. application of SD rules in statistics.
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These traditional SD rules have been developed to offer, in many cases,
efficient criteria on decision making in both theory and application (Levy,
1992). However, these conventional rules sometimes have limitation in
failing to reveal some obvious dominance between prospects due to some
extreme utility functions in the case of even a very small violation of these
rules. Such examples can be seen in Leshno and Levy (2002).
Almost SD
The theory of ASD developed by Leshno and Levy (2002) plays an impor-
tant role in several fields, particularly in finance. They provide a new way
of imposing restrictions on the first and second derivatives of utility func-
tions so that the preferences that do not represent most decision makers
are excluded.
Since Leshno and Levy’s paper, other works have further drawn sev-
eral important applications. For example, Levy (2009) employs ASD to
make the case for “stocks for the long run”. It is shown that ASD and
the geometric-mean argument do not necessarily support long-run invest-
ment in equities. Specifically, bonds may be preferred to stocks over a
short horizon, but stocks are preferred in the long run. Regarding invest-
ment strategies, Bali et al. (2009) use data from the United States to show
that the ASD approach unambiguously supports the popular practice that
suggests a higher stock-to-bond ratio for long investment horizons. Levy
et al. (2010) construct several experiments to show that the ASD rule cor-
responds to sets of non-pathological preferences. Bali et al. (2011) further
adopt the ASD rule to examine the practice of investing in stock market
anomalies. They found that the ASD rule provides evidence for “the sig-
nificance of size, short-term reversal, and momentum for short investment
horizons and the significance of book-to-market and long-term reversal for
longer term horizons” (pp. 18). Lizyayev and Ruszczyn´ski (2012) comment
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on the difficulty of introducing ASD constraints within an optimization
model and provide an alternative tractable formulation.
Tzeng et al. (2013) show that the almost second degree SD introduced
by Leshno and Levy (2002) does not possess the property of expected-
utility maximization. They modify the definition of the ASD to achieve
this property. Nonetheless, Guo et al. (2013a) construct some examples
to show that the ASD definition modified by Tzeng et al. (2013) does not
possess any hierarchy property and establish necessary conditions for ASD
criteria of various orders in Guo et al. (2013).
The advantages of ASD over SD and the mean-variance rule are as
follows:
1. ASD is able to rank otherwise unrankable alternatives.
2. ASD can eliminate alternatives that are considered to be inferior by
most investors.
3. ASD sheds light on the debate related to optimal portfolio compo-
sition and the planned investor horizon. It is possible to establish a
functional relationship between the percentage of equity in the port-
folio and the planned investors horizon. Namely, ASD may be em-
ployed by financial advisors in choosing portfolios for young versus
old investors.
However, Tan (2015) points out that ASD fails to reveal the preference
relationships observed in St. Petersburg paradox. As a result, the re-
lated concept of weighted almost stochastic dominance (WASD) has been
proposed. Specifically, a reference function is introduced and the set of
utility functions whose marginal utility differs from the reference marginal
function by a maximum factor is considered.
Tsetlin et al. (2015) develop generalized almost stochastic dominance
which combines different rules of almost stochastic dominance into one
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framework. This concept addresses the implementation issues and incon-
sistencies between integral conditions and their associated utility classes of
different rules of ASD.
Risk preference among decision makers
Risk preference is the tendency to choose a risky or less risky position.
Different decision makers may have different risk attitudes. There are three
basic types of risk preferences: risk-averse, risk seeking and risk-neutral.
Risk-averse decision makers dislike risk. They will stay away from
adding high-risk investments to portfolios and, in turn, will often forfeit
higher return. Such decision makers are generally characterized by concave
utility functions. Risk-seeking decision makers, in contrast, are generally
characterized by convex utility functions. Theoretical works linking SD
theory to the selection rules for risk-averse and risk-seeking decision mak-
ers under different restrictions on the utility functions has also been well
investigated. Quirk and Saposnik (1962), Hanoch and Levy (1969) develop
the theory of SD related to economics and obtained SD rules for risk-averse
decision makers. To distinguish SD theory for risk-averse decision makers
from that for risk-seeking decision makers, they call this ascending stochas-
tic dominance because the cumulative distribution function is integrated
in ascending order from the leftmost point of downside risk.
On the other hand, Hammond (1974), Li and Wong (1999), and Wong
(2007) develop the stochastic dominance rules for risk-seeking decision mak-
ers, which they call descending stochastic dominance because the cumula-
tive distribution function is integrated in descending order from the right-
most point of upside profit.
The application of ASD to risk-averse and risk seeking decision makers
has been discussed. The theory of second-order ASD developed by Leshno
and Levy (2002) can be considered as the case for risk-averse decision mak-
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ers. ASD relationships for risk-seeking decision makers to the first three
orders are developed by Guo et al. (2013b).
Among different risk preferences, risk-aversion is of great interest due
to its prevalence across decision makers. Eckel and Grossman (2008) show
that decision makers are generally risk-averse via abstract gamble experi-
ments and contextual environment experiments. In particular, their study
suggests that women generally have greater risk aversion then men. More-
over, these results from both kinds of experiments are consistent with field
studies. Rieger et al. (2015) conduct an extensive international survey on
risk preferences which reveals an attitude of risk aversion in gains and risk
seeking in losses on average. Furthermore, they highlight that the degree
of risk attitudes is affected by different factors such as economic conditions
and cultural factors. Brenner (2015) proposes a subjective option valuation
model to probe the risk preferences of U.S. executives. The author con-
cludes that the observed behavior among 7000 U.S. executives is basically
consistent with moderate relative risk aversion.
In conclusion, risk aversion is prevalent among most decision makers.
Hence, it is interesting to consider risk aversion in weighted almost stochas-
tic dominance relationships. Moreover, we expect that we could control the
degree of risk aversion in this new SD relationship so that it better describes
the behavior of decision makers.
3.1.2 Optimization framework of ASD
The connection between stochastic dominance relationships and optimiza-
tion problems has been broadly discussed. One possible way is to form the
stochastic dominance relationships in the constraints.
We start with the univariate case. Dentcheva and Ruszczyn´ski (2003)
introduce SD constraints into stochastic optimization problems and develop
necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality and duality theory for their
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proposed optimization framework. They also show that Lagrange multi-
pliers regarding dominance constraints are concave non-decreasing utility
functions, which is consistent with risk-averse preference. Again Dentcheva
and Ruszczyn´ski (2004) introduce SD relationships with second order into
stochastic optimization problems which leads to nonlinear constraints. In
this case, they develop a new splitting approach and provide the corre-
sponding optimality and duality theory.
The time horizon is another factor that could be of interest. For ex-
ample, Dentcheva and Ruszczyn´ski (2008) are interested in a finite horizon
stochastic programming problem which improves the model by introduc-
ing a random reward sequence into the constraints. The dominance in the
constraints is defined by discounting two processes: a family of discount
sequences, and by applying a univariate order. Optimality conditions are
also provided. Haskell and Jain (2013) formulate stochastic dominance
constraints for infinite horizon discrete time Markov decision processes
(MDPs). They use a linear programming model to obtain the optimal pol-
icy and compute the dual of this linear program to obtain average dynamic
programming optimality equations that reflect the dominance constraints.
This work has also been extended to the multivariate case. Dentcheva
and Ruszczyn´ski (2009) extend the optimization model they proposed in
Dentcheva and Ruszczyn´ski (2003) to the multivariate case. They identify
a suitable multivariate stochastic order and describe its generator in terms
of utility functions. With the assumption of convexity, they reveal that the
Lagrange multipliers regarding dominance constraints are elements of the
generator.
Haskell et al. (2013) introduce stochastic order constraints defined in
terms of parametrized families of increasing concave functions. They show
that utility functions behave as the Lagrange multipliers of the correspond-
ing constraints, and that the dual problem is a search over utility functions.
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Homem-de Mello and Mehrotra (2009) introduce the cut generation
problem. In particular, they discuss linear optimization problems with a
newly introduced concept of multidimensional polyhedral linear second-
order stochastic dominance constraints and propose a cutting-surface algo-
rithm to deal with this problem.
Hu et al. (2012) study optimization problems with multivariate stochas-
tic dominance constraints of second order. They apply the Sample Average
Approximation (SAA) method to this problem which is a semi-infinite pro-
gram and develop a finitely convergent method to find an -optimal solution
of the SAA problem.
It can be noted that the above mentioned works implement a para-
metric representation of the utility functions used to reflect the dominance
constraints. From a different perspective, a non-parametric representation
of the utility functions can be employed. Luedtke (2008) suggests new
integer and linear programming formulations for optimization under first-
and second-order stochastic dominance constraints. They also present a
specialized branching strategy and heuristics. Armbruster and Luedtke
(2015) proposes a constraint using a new version of multivariate stochas-
tic dominance which connects to expected utility maximization theory and
is relatively tractable. The good thing here is that such a constraint can
be formulated with linear constraints for second-order dominance relations
and with mixed-integer constraints for first-order relations. Haskell et al.
(2014) investigate the optimization problem with an infinite number of
constraints indexed by a function space of non-decreasing concave utility
functions. They focus on effective numerical methods of SAA formulation
and Lagrangian duality theory.
In the above mentioned previous studies, one issue that can be noted
is that the optimization frameworks generally require a benchmark in or-
der to introduce the stochastic dominance constraints (i.e. the desired
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prospect depending on our decisions should stochastically dominate the
given benchmark). However, the choice of a benchmark is not trivial to
make and remains an interesting topic to explore. So far we do not have
reasonable guidance in constructing a benchmark, in particular, for differ-
ent risk preferences. The robust certainty equivalent firstly introduced in
Armbruster and Delage (2015) is an alternative, which is a different concept
from Ben-Tal and Teboulle (2007).
Another issue is that there is limited work in formulating almost stochas-
tic dominance constraints, or more generally weighted almost stochastic
dominance, in optimization problems. Therefore, it is interesting to formu-
late almost, as well as, weighted almost stochastic dominance constraints
in our optimization framework.
3.2 Risk measures
In this section, we firstly review the previous work on risk measure with
some good properties (e.g. coherent risk measure). Specifically, we are
interested in scalar-valued and vector-valued risk measures. In addition
to the review on risk measures, previous studies that aim to develop the
optimization framework for general risk measures are also discussed. In
particular, we focus on studies related to our four main considerations
respectively.
3.2.1 Scalar-valued risk measures
We start with the review on scalar-valued risk measure functions. Risk
measures in this category return a real scalar to reflect the degree of risk.
Artzner et al. (1999) is a pioneering paper in coherent risk measure which
discusses methods of measurement of market and non-market risks. In par-
ticular they determine a set of four desirable properties and refer to the
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measures satisfying these properties “coherent”. Follmer and Schied (2002)
propose the concept of a convex risk measure which is an extension of the
idea in Artzner et al. (1999). They prove a corresponding extension of the
representation theorem in terms of probability measures on the underlying
space of scenarios. Ruszczyn´ski and Shapiro (2006) introduce convex risk
functions in optimization problems. Specifically they develop new repre-
sentation theorems for risk models, and optimality and duality theory for
problems with convex risk functions with convex analysis and optimization
theory.
3.2.2 Vector-valued risk measures
When dealing with multivariate prospects it is sometimes more natural
to use vector-valued risk functions. Risk functions are extended to the
vector-valued setting in Jouini et al. (2004) and Burgert and Rschendorf
(2006). Jouini et al. (2004) defines coherent risk measures as set-valued
maps from L∞n into Rd satisfying some axioms. They also discuss the ag-
gregation issue as well as necessary and sufficient conditions of coherent
aggregation. Burgert and Rschendorf (2006) introduce convex risk mea-
sures for portfolio vectors defined axiomatically. They further illustrate
two natural classes of examples of risk measures for portfolio vectors which
are easy to interpret and investigate their corresponding properties. Cascos
and Molchanov (2007) develop risk functions that take values in abstract
cones, which include the classical risk measures and set-valued risk mea-
sures and obtains a natural definition of vector-valued risk measures. They
also demonstrate that the idea of depth-trimmed regions from multivariate
statistics is closely associated with the definition of risk measures. Hamel
and Heyde (2010) define set-valued convex measures of risk as well as the
corresponding acceptance sets. They also show their dual representation
theorems. Set-valued measures of risk are also provided based on primal
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and dual descriptions. Ararat et al. (2014) shed light on multi-asset fi-
nancial market with frictions. The utility-based risk of a financial posi-
tion with such conditions can be quantified by set-valued risk measures,
and market frictions are modeled by convex random solvency regions rep-
resenting proportional transaction costs or illiquidity effects. Molchanov
and Cascos (2016) consider risky positions in multivariate portfolios and
give a constructive approach for vector-valued risk functions where a set-
valued portfolio is acceptable if it possesses a selection where all individual
marginals are acceptable. The obtained risk measure possesses the good
properties of coherency, law invariance and having values being upper con-
vex closed sets. The dual representation was also provided.
3.3 Optimization of general risk measures
It is not always suitable to guarantee the reliability of a decision when we
maximize expected performance in stochastic optimization. As a result,
a number of risk measures, which generalize expected performance, have
been proposed to give the decision maker flexibility in expressing his risk
preferences. However, it is still challenging to do risk-aware optimization
in practice from both a modeling and a computational perspective. In
this section, previous studies pertaining to the four considerations (i.e.
multivariate prospects, preference uncertainty, computational tractability,
target-oriented measure) mentioned in the introduction will be reviewed.
3.3.1 Multivariate prospects
A general risk-aware optimization framework must be able to handle mul-
tiple criteria. Many key problems in stochastic optimization have multiple
criteria. Thus, an effective risk management paradigm must be able to
handle multivariate random prospects.
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Gutjahr and Pichler (2013) survey many key stochastic multi-objective
optimization problems and their solution techniques, and focuses on the
analysis of decision-making problems that simultaneously consider multi-
ple objectives and stochastically represented uncertainty. It is argued that
many key problems are naturally multi-objective. In Liefooghe et al. (2007),
a multi-objective formulation of the flow-shop scheduling problem sub-
jected to a wide range of uncertainties is proposed. Several multi-objective
methods that are able to handle any type of probability distribution are
also discussed. Chen et al. (2010) consider three stochastic multi-objective
models for designing transportation network under demand uncertainty,
and show how to compute Pareto optimal solutions that explicitly opti-
mize all objectives under demand uncertainty by simultaneously generating
a family of optimal solutions.
It can be noted that the combination of multiple decision criteria and
uncertainty is of great interest for its practical usefulness. Many financial
positions, for instance, a portfolio whose assets cannot be aggregated, fall
into the multivariate case.
3.3.2 Preference uncertainty
It is difficult for a decision maker to precisely express his risk preferences.
In response, a practical risk management system must be robust against
ambiguity in risk preferences. The case of expected utility maximization
has received major attention.
In Armbruster and Delage (2015), ambiguity in risk preferences is con-
sidered in expected utility maximization. They propose finding a solution
that is robust to a set of possible utility functions obtained by preference
elicitation. In particular, they showed that the worst-case utility can be
expressed as the maximum of a reasonable sized linear program. In Delage
and Li (2015), the discussion is extended to ambiguity in risk preferences
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over general risk functions. They seek financial positions that perform
best given the worst-case of the risk measure potentially perceived by the
decision maker and show how this robust risk minimization problem can
be solved numerically by formulating convex optimization problems in a
tractable way.
The assumption of incomplete preference information is necessary. Al-
though it has been highlighted that risk-aversion is prevalent in people’s be-
havior, risk-seeking behavior or a mixture of the two has also been observed
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Even for risk-averse decision makers, the
extent to which they are risk-averse also differs.
3.3.3 Computational tractability
Some research work has been done focusing on the computational tractabil-
ity of robust optimization, which is a topic of major concern in the litera-
ture. Goh and Sim (2010) deals with a linear programming problem with
uncertainties, which has expected values both in the objective and con-
straints. They obtain an approximate solution to the problem that is dis-
tributionally robust which is more flexible than using linear decision rules.
In Wiesemann et al. (2014), distributionally robust optimization is studied
where the true probability distribution lies in standardized ambiguity sets.
In particular, we are interested in risk-aware frameworks that can be
evaluated with convex optimization techniques. For instance, the risk-
aware formulations in Armbruster and Delage (2015) and Delage and Li
(2015) can be cast as convex optimization problems on finite probability
spaces. In Haskell et al. (2014), the technique in Armbruster and Delage
(2015) is combined with sample average approximation and extended to
the multivariate setting on general probability spaces.
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3.3.4 Target-oriented measure
In real life, it is often the case to make a specific amount of monetary
reward and to interpret risk in terms of loss to meet this target. Therefore,
a decision maker often evaluates the fitness of his decision with respect to
a target or goal. A comprehensive optimization framework should ideally
be able to take such targets into account.
Brown and Sim (2009) firstly propose satisficing measures to quantify
risk of financial positions based on the ability to achieve financial tar-
gets. Brown et al. (2012) continue this work and develop a general class
of aspirational risk preferences by showing that these preferences share a
representation in terms of targets. It can be noted that a target-based risk
measure has the advantage of easy interpretation and is more natural to
specify than risk tolerance parameters.
Based on the above mentioned four considerations, we are interested
in the formulations that can be evaluated with convex optimization tech-
niques. Basically, the approaches that deal with risk measure can be cat-
egorized into two types. One type is by subgradient characterization, as
shown in Armbruster and Delage (2015), Delage and Li (2015) and Haskell
et al. (2014). The other one is the acceptance approach. The previous re-
lated work are Jouini et al. (2004), Burgert and Rschendorf (2006), Hamel
et al. (2011), and Molchanov and Cascos (2016).
The review above has revealed that many aspects are discussed in terms
of the optimization framework. However, a unified framework of almost
stochastic dominance that satisfies all four considerations is still not well
studied. Furthermore, the algorithms with respect to the framework are




stochastic dominance and its
optimization
4.1 Introduction
As reviewed in Section 3.1, the theory of stochastic dominance has been in-
vestigated extensively and deeply. The introduction of almost and weighted
almost stochastic dominance provides more flexibility in decisions rules as
well as more reasonable restrictions on the set of utility functions consid-
ered. In particular, ASD requires that the marginal utilities do not deviate
by a maximum factor while WASD requires that the marginal utilities do
not deviate from that of a reference utility by a maximum factor. WASD re-
duces to ASD when the reference utility is linear. However, these concepts
do not consider the risk-aversion factor which, as highlighted previously, is
prevalent among decision makers. Therefore, it is natural and reasonable
to focus on risk-averse decision makers in WASD.
The combination of stochastic dominance relationships and optimiza-
tion methods has been broadly discussed in the previous chapter. One
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natural way is to form the stochastic dominance relationships in the con-
straints. However, there is limited work in formulating ASD nor WASD
constraints in optimization problems.
In this chapter, we will first propose WASD relationship under risk-
averse preferences. The necessary and sufficient conditions would be pro-
vided. Next, we will formulate our proposed WASD in the constraints in
our optimization framework. We will resort to linear programming and its
duality as our technique. Generalized stochastic dominance relationship
introduced by Tsetlin et al. (2015) can be investigated in a similar way.
As noted, these is no reasonable guidance in the construction of a bench-
mark in SD constraints. As a remedy, an optimization framework of robust
certainty equivalent maximization problem will also be discussed.
In the following, the conditions for WASD for risk-averse decision mak-
ers are defined in Section 4.2. A WASD constrained convex optimization
framework for risk averse decision makers will be obtained in Section 4.3.
Section 4.3.3 formulates the WASD as a robust certainty equivalent maxi-
mization problem.
4.2 Weighted risk-averse almost stochastic
dominance
4.2.1 Preliminary
There are a variety of SD relationships, each accounting for a different
set of utility functions. We would like to provide a flexible optimization
framework that can deal with these relationships by providing a particular
category of stochastic dominance relationships on L.
There is a difficulty with using conventional SD relationships because
the corresponding utility sets contain “extreme” utility functions that do
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not correspond to decision makers observed in practice. One example would
be that most “reasonable” investors would prefer a higher proportion of
stocks as the investment horizon increases (Leshno and Levy, 2002). An
“extreme” utility function could be in the form of not assigning a relatively
high marginal utility to very low values or a relatively low marginal utility
to large values. These relationships on L are thus quite restrictive and lead
to challenges for use in practice. In optimization problems, they may even
make the problem infeasible.
ASD resolves this difficulty by giving relaxations of traditional stochas-
tic dominance relationships. Several notions of ASD that are more flexible
than conventional SD have been proposed. The idea is to choose a strict
subset of the corresponding utility set of conventional SD that gives rise
to a weaker stochastic dominance relation but that only includes realistic
utility functions.
Recently, Tan (2015) proposed the necessary and sufficient conditions
for WASD, which implies the unanimous preference by all individuals with
non-decreasing utility functions whose marginal utilities are bounded by a
reference marginal utility. However, it can be noted that risk-aversion is
prevalent among decision makers and therefore we suggest including con-
cavity restrictions in WASD.
4.2.2 Necessary and sufficient conditions
Here, we develop a new almost stochastic dominance relationship based on
the marginal utilities of the decision maker. There are multiple reasons
why our proposed condition is of interest:
1. Individuals have been observed to be risk-averse under multiple set-
tings (Brenner, 2015; Rieger et al., 2015). Therefore, the analyst may
wish to check for unanimous preference across all non-extreme and
non-decreasing concave utility functions, rather than across all non-
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extreme and non-decreasing utility functions, when screening a set of
feasible acts. In particular, the efficient set (i.e., set of non-dominated
acts) obtained by WASD may contain acts that are only preferred by
risk-seeking individuals and can be further eliminated if the decision
maker is known to be risk-averse. Hence, our proposed condition can
reduce the size of the efficient set, simplifying the decision process.
2. From the perspective of optimization, our proposed condition has ad-
vantages over ASD and second-degree stochastic dominance (SSD).
Firstly, our condition leads to convex optimization problems because
it is defined in terms of non-decreasing concave functions. ASD in-
cludes non-convex functions, and thus we may not obtain convex op-
timization problems under ASD. Secondly, our condition is more flex-
ible than SSD and it gives the decision maker more modeling power.
Specifically, even if the decision maker sets a reasonable benchmark
for performance, there may not be any feasible decisions which domi-
nate the benchmark in SSD. However, feasible optimization problems
can be obtained for reasonable benchmarks under our proposed con-
dition by adjusting the parameter ε, when necessary.
We present a necessary and sufficient condition for unanimous pref-
erence by all rational risk-averse decision makers whose utility does not
deviate too much from a reference utility. We term our condition weighted
risk-averse almost stochastic dominance (WRASD).
Definition 4.2.1. Weighted risk-averse almost stochastic dominance. Given
a constant 0 < ε < 0.5, we define the family of utility functions
Uw (m, ε) ,
{











m (x) , ∀x ∈ X
}
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We call the resulting relationship “weighted risk-averse almost stochastic
dominance” (WRASD) if E [u (X)] ≥ E [u (Y )] for all u ∈ Uw (m, ε).
Fig. 4.1. Illustration of set Uw (m, ε).
The set Uw (m, ε) is the set of all differentiable nondecreasing concave





− 1]0.5, as shown in Figure 4.1. It provides greater flexibility in
expressing risk preferences than Uicv through user control over the weight
function m and the parameter ε. From the definition, we see that functions














m (ξ) dξ, ∀x ∈ X .
Example 4.2.1. CRRA (Constant relative risk-averse) utility functions





1−α if α > 0, α 6= 1,
lnx if α = 1,
where α is the risk aversion parameter. In this case the weight function
m(x) has the form:
m(x) = x−α, α > 0.
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In the following theorem, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for
the preference of X over Y by WRASD to hold in terms of the cumulative
distribution functions FX and FY , respectively.





























[FY (t)− FX(t)] dt.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 4.2.1 provides a condition that can be used to check for unan-
imous preference by all rational risk-averse decision makers whose utility
does not deviate too much from a reference utility by a maximum factor(
1
ε
− 1). The proof of the theorem is based on the observation that the
second derivative of a concave utility function is non-increasing. Hence,
it is sufficient to ensure preference for all utility functions whose marginal
utility at the smallest and largest element in X , rather than across the





It is noted that WRASD is based on the difference between the area
under FX and FY (i.e., FY (t) − FX(t)) and is different from ASD, which
is based on the area between FX and FY (i.e., ||FX − FY ||). In particular,
the max term in the left hand side of Equation (4.1) is the largest violation
area, which is A1 as shown in Figure 4.2; the integral term in the right hand
side of Equation (4.1) is the real area of intersection between the two cdfs,
not the area in absolute value, which is A2 − A1 as shown in Figure 4.2.
Example 4.2.2. We provide an example to illustrate WRASD relation-
ship. Suppose we have two discrete random variables X and Y and their
probability mass functions:
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Fig. 4.2. Illustration of WRASD.
Fig. 4.3. Cumulative distribution functions of X and Y
37
Table 4.1
Probability mass functions of X and Y .
t 1000 2000 3000 4000
Pr(X = t) 0 0.65 0 0.35
Pr(Y = t) 0.32 0 0.68 0
The cumulative distribution functions of X and Y can be seen in Fig-
ure 4.3. In this case, xmin = 1000, xmax = 4000. According to the cumula-










[FX(t)− FY (t)] dt = 10,
and ∫ xmax
xmin
[FY (t)− FX(t)] dt = 340.
In addition, we suppose the utility function of the decision maker can
be approximated by a logarithm function. Therefore, we have m(x) = x−1.

































Therefore, ε ≥ ε∗ = 4
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= 0.103. We conclude that the preference for X
over Y can be guaranteed for all rational risk-averse decision makers whose







4.3 Optimization with stochastic dominance
We believe that Armbruster and Delage (2015) addresses an important lim-
itation in conventional stochastic optimization approaches and that their
proposed approach is suitable when we have very limited information re-
garding the utility function of the decision maker (e.g., only know that the
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decision maker is risk averse) and it is possible to have the decision maker
evaluate a series of pairwise comparisons between lotteries. A difficulty
in applying the approach proposed by Armbruster and Delage (2015) is
that decision makers may not be willing or may be biased to make a se-
ries of pairwise comparisons between lotteries in practice. In such a case,
the analyst may wish to determine the optimal solution based on a CRRA
utility function, which can be appropriate for describing the preferences of
individuals across multiple settings (see Wakker (2008)). The appropriate
γ value to use in the CRRA function can be based on earlier work, like
the study by Brenner (2015) which provides comprehensive risk aversion
parameters estimates based on option exercising data.
It is important to note that, in this work, we do not assume that the
preference of the decision maker is perfectly described by a CRRA utility
function. If that were so, the robustness of a solution with respect to de-
viation in the value of α can easily be studied by conventional sensitivity
analysis. Rather, we merely assume that the utility function of the decision
maker deviates marginally from a CRRA utility function with predefined
risk aversion parameter. This assumption is more appropriate as it is un-
likely that the preference of the decision maker is perfectly described by a
CRRA utility function in practice.
In this section, we consider the case where the decision maker’s util-
ity function can be estimated reasonably well by some parametric function
(e.g., CRRA utility function). We seek a solution that is robust to devia-
tions from our estimated utility function. In particular, we consider a set of
utility functions whose marginal utility deviates from a reference marginal
utility by no greater than some predefined factor τ . We note that this set
is similar to that which was proposed by Tan (2015) in defining WASD to
explain the unanimous preference for the non-risky reward observed in the
classical St. Petersburg paradox (Bernoulli, 1954).
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Our result is particularly helpful in practice because constraints based
on conventional stochastic dominance can be too strict, resulting in poor
solutions. In the extreme case, the introduction of these stochastic dom-
inance constraints can result in infeasible optimization problems (i.e., no
feasible solution stochastically dominates the benchmark), as we will illus-
trate in a numerical example using a simple portfolio optimization problem.
The introduction of WASD constraints, rather than constraints based on
conventional stochastic dominance, provides the analyst with the flexibility
to adjust the degree of dominance desired.
4.3.1 Problem description
In the stochastic optimization literature, it is often assumed that the utility
function of the decision maker is available. However, the utility function
of the decision maker is generally unknown in practice. One way to resolve
this problem is to elicit the utility function by asking the decision maker
to make a series of pairwise comparisons between lotteries.
As defined in Section 2.1, we have a random variable G (z) determined
by the elements in the decision set Z. In this chapter, we consider G (z)
as reward. In particular, we will benchmark G against Y with respect to
almost stochastic dominance. We first shed light on the set of all nonde-




{f (z) : G (z) U Y } . (4.2)
Problem (4.2) has finitely many variables and infinitely many con-
straints via the SD relationship of G (z) and Y . As a semi-infinite pro-
gramming problem, Problem (4.2) is generally difficult to solve because we
cannot enumerate all of the constraints. The main difficulty is that the
constraint index set U in Problem (4.2) is an infinite-dimensional space of
functions. However, if U is suitably chosen then we can use linear pro-
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gramming duality to get a more tractable representation of the dominance
constraint.
Since the SD relationship can be revealed by the expected utility given
the corresponding utility set, we can deal with the SD relationship by using
the shortfall function
ψ (G (z) ; U, Y ) , inf
u∈U
E [u (G (z))− u (Y )] . (4.3)
It can be noted that function ψ (G (z) ; U, Y ) is concave with respect to z.
Each z → E [u (G (z))− u (Y )] is concave by Assumption A2 and the fact
that u ∈ Uicv. The infimum of concave functions is concave.




{f (z) : ψ (G (z) ; U, Y ) ≥ 0} . (4.4)
Problems (4.2) and (4.4) are equivalent, but Problem (4.4) is in a more
computationally advantageous form as we will see. Immediately, we can
see that Problem (4.4) is a convex optimization problem. The objective
f is concave by Assumption A3, and the implicit constraints z ∈ Z are
convex by Assumption A1.
For Problem (4.4), the general scheme is as follows with two stages:
1. Take the dual of the minimization in Problem (4.3) to obtain a min-
imization problem
2. Amalgamate the two maximization objectives to obtain a single min-
imization problem
When the minimization in Problem (4.3) can be written as the linear
programming problem (abusing notation)
min
x





{〈b, p〉 : A∗p ≤ g (G (z))}
then we can write Problem (4.4) as
max
z∈Z, p
{f (z) : 〈b, p〉 ≥ 0;A∗p ≤ g (G (z))} ,
which is a convex optimization problem.
In addition, Assumptions A4 and A5 hold here. Since, we introduce
a discretization Θ , {θ1, . . . , θK} ⊂ X of X where θ1 < θ2 < · · · < θK ,
θ1 = xmin, and θK = xmax. In this case, we can produce Θ by dividing
the interval X uniformly. Then the length of the uniform sub-intervals is
a measure of the granularity of Θ. Since both the benchmark Y and Θ are
user inputs, we could ensure that the discretization Θ includes the support
of Y .
In order to solve Problem (4.4), we start with the subproblem (4.3).
Basically we have two steps in solving Problem (4.3), as in Haskell et al.
(2014):
1. Determine the values of u on the finite set Θ, vk = u (θk) for k =
1, . . . , K.
2. Interpolate among {vk}Kk=1 to compute the term
E [u (G(z))] =
∑
ω∈Ω
P ({ω})u (G(z) (ω))
by setting the values {u (G(z) (ω))}ω∈Ω.
Since interpolation is required, we resort to piecewise linear function.
Let:
• vk be the value of u at θk for k = 1, . . . , K (without loss of generality
we just take v0 = 0);
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• sk be the slope of u on (θk, θk+1) for k = 1, . . . , K − 1.
Then a piecewise linear function u ∈ C (X ) will be like
u (x) = sk (x− θk) + vk, x ∈ [θk, θk+1] , ∀k = 1, . . . , K − 1,
In this way, we can ensure the continuity of utility functions. This
piecewise linear u therefore is completely determined by its values at its
breakpoints v = {vk}Kk=1 ∈ RK and the subgradients at the breakpoints
s = {sk}K−1k=1 ∈ RK−1.
The following result is a necessary condition for a piecewise linear u to
lie in Uicv. With this result, the first step above mentioned is done. The
values of u on the finite set Θ can be determined.
Lemma 4.3.1 (Haskell et al. (2016)). (i) Let u ∈ Uicv, then there exist
v = {vk}Kk=1 ∈ RK and s = {sk}K−1k=1 ∈ RK−1 such that
vk+1 = sk (θk+1 − θk) + vk, ∀k = 1, . . . , K − 1,
sk ≥ sk+1 ≥ 0, ∀k = 1, . . . , K − 2.
(ii) Given {vk}Kk=1 ∈ RK and {sk}K−1k=1 ∈ RK−1, define
u∗ (x) = min
k
{sk (θk+1 − θk) + vk} ,
then u∗ ∈ Uicv.
Proof. See Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004), Subsection 6.5.5. We see that
this condition is simply the requirement that a subgradient exists for u at
all θ ∈ Θ, and that the subgradients are decreasing.
In Lemma 4.3.1, we set up the framework of a non-decreasing con-
cave utility function, that is, the discrete values {vk}Kk=1 would lie on a
non-decreasing concave function. In the first step, since the domain is
43
Fig. 4.4. Illustration of Lemma 4.3.1 (i).
Fig. 4.5. Illustration of Lemma 4.3.1 (ii).
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dicretized, there are many intervals. In each interval, there is a linear func-
tion determined by the values of two end points. Among the intervals, the
slopes of linear functions are in the non-increasing order, as shown in Fig-
ure 4.4. In part (ii), we aim to find the lowest part of all linear functions in
each interval via the minimization problem. Thus the resulting piecewise
function is concave, as shown in Figure 4.5.
The next lemma describes a procedure for linearly interpolating between
values {u (θ)}θ∈Θ for any u ∈ Uicv. With this result, the second step above
mentioned can be done.
Lemma 4.3.2 (Haskell et al. (2016)). Let u ∈ Uicv, and define
u∗ (x) , min
a≥0, b∈R
a x+ b
s.t. a θ + b ≥ u (θ) ,∀θ ∈ Θ.
i) u∗ is nondecreasing and concave.
ii) u∗ is equal to −∞ outside conv {Θ} ∪ R+.
iii) If uˆ is another increasing concave function with uˆ (θ) ≥ u (θ) for all
θ ∈ Θ, then uˆ ≥ u∗.
Proof. i) The function u∗ is increasing and convex as it is the supreme of
increasing linear functions. It is also immediate that u∗ (θ) = u (θ) for all
θ ∈ Θ.
ii) In the domain where it is outside conv {Θ} ∪R+, since we minimize
on a such that a ≥ 0, we will have a→∞ which results in u∗ → −∞.
iii) Moreover, u∗ ≤ uˆ for any uˆ ∈ Uicv with uˆ (θ) ≥ u (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
We see that the hypograph of u∗ is by definition the intersection of the
hypographs of all uˆ ∈ Uicv with uˆ (θ) ≥ u (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
In Lemma 4.3.2, for any values determined by decision makers, we in-
terpolate them among the framework we have set up in Lemma 4.3.1, that
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Fig. 4.6. Illustration of Lemma 4.3.2.
is, they will lie one the piecewise concave function, as shown in Figure 4.6.
Theorem 1 in Armbruster and Delage (2015) gives a similar proof as
well. By observation, u∗ has the following form according to Lemma 4.3.2:
u∗ (x) = u (θk)+
u (θk+1)− u (θk)
θk+1 − θk (x− θk) , x ∈ [θk, θk+1] , ∀k = 1, . . . , K−1.
It follows that Lemma 4.3.2 can be used to linearly interpolate between the
values of a piecewise linear u given by {vk}Kk=1.
To achieve this, we introduce some additional decision variables for the
later development: x→ aωx+bω represents a linear function corresponding
to each scenario ω ∈ Ω. Let a = {aω}ω∈Ω ∈ R|Ω| and b = {bω}ω∈Ω ∈ R|Ω| be
the parameters for the family of linear functions just defined. We use these
functions to linearly interpolate among the values {vk}Kk=1 of a piecewise
linear function.
So far, we have done the two steps so that the utility function linearly
interpolated is non-decreasing and concave. For the sake of convenience,
we define the following set:
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For this result, let
Vp ,
{
(v, s, a, b) ∈ RK × RK−1 × R|Ω| × R|Ω| :y
vk+1 = sk (θk+1 − θk) + vk, ∀k = 1, . . . , K − 1,
aωθk + bω ≥ vk, ∀k = 1, . . . , K, ∀ω ∈ Ω,
sk ≥ sk+1 ≥ 0, ∀k = 1, . . . , K − 2,
a ≥ 0, v1 = 0} .
represent a set of constraints on the parameter values that determine a
piecewise linear u. We can use it in our upcoming linear programming
formulation because this set consists of only linear constraints on the vari-
ables.
4.3.2 Weighted risk-averse almost stochastic domi-
nance
In the previous section, we have investigated how to interpolate nondecreas-
ing and concave utility functions piecewise linearly. This corresponds to
conventional SD relationships. However, this is not practical since the set of
nondecreasing and concave utility functions contains “extreme” functions,
which does not describe the preferences of most individuals in practice.
WRASD, which can reveal unanimous preference by all rational risk-averse
decision makers whose utility does not deviate too much from a reference




− 1), can be more appropriate. Therefore,
the SD we proposed in Section 4.2 provides a good solution to this problem.
We are specifically interested in
sup
z∈Z
{f (z) : ψ (G (z) ; Uw (m, ε) , Y ) ≥ 0} , (4.5)
where the dominance constraints are generated by WRASD.
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In this circumstance, the piecewise linear utility function should fall
in some range determined by the weight function. This can be realized by
imposing constraints on the subgradients at the breakpoints of the piecewise
linear utility function. Since the utility function is interpolated piecewise
linearly, it is reasonable to assume a piecewise linear reference utility. This
leads to the piecewise constant weight function m0 : X → R.
m0 (x) = wk,∀x ∈ [θk, θk+1), ∀k = 1, . . . , K − 2,
m0 (x) = wK−1,∀x ∈ [θK−1, θK ] .
This is the most basic possible form. We will see that by imposing
constraints on the subgradients at the breakpoints of the piecewise linear
utility function leads to linear programming.
In the next theorem, we show that ψ (X; Uw (m0, ε) , Y ) can be solved
by a linear programming problem:
Theorem 4.3.1. Suppose Ω is finite and X, Y ∈ L, then ψ (X; Uw (m0, ε) , Y )
is equal to the optimal value of the following linear programming problem:
min
v, s, a, b
∑
ω∈Ω
P ({ω}) (aωX (ω) + bω)−
K∑
k=1
Pr {Y = θk} vk (4.6)











wk, ∀k = 1, . . . , K − 1. (4.8)
Proof. The objective term
∑
ω∈Ω P ({ω}) (aωX (ω) + bω) and constraint (4.7)
correspond to Lemma 4.3.1 and Lemma 4.3.2, and the objective term∑K
k=1 Pr {Y = θk} vk corresponds to E [u (Y )]. Finally, constraint (4.8) cor-
responds to the weight function and expresses the weights on the subgra-
dients of u ∈ Uw (m0, ε) required by WRASD.
The proceeding theorem discusses the dual to Problem (4.6) - (4.8)and
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shows how to solve Problem (4.5) directly by using linear programming
duality. We introduce dual decision variables λ = {λk}K−1k=1 ∈ RK−1, µ =








Theorem 4.3.2. (i) Problem (4.5) is equivalent to
max
























− Pr ({Y = θk}) + λk−1 − λk +
∑
ω∈Ω
δkω = 0, ∀k = 1, . . . , K,
(4.11)
− λk (θk+1 − θk) + µk−1 − µk − γlk + γuk ≥ 0, ∀k = 1, . . . , K − 1,
(4.12)
P ({ω}) [G (z)] (ω)−
K∑
k=1




δkω = 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω. (4.14)
(ii) Problem (4.9) - (4.14) is a convex optimization problem.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Remember that we have just introduced the piecewise constant weight
function, which is the most basic form. We now evaluate how well a piece-
wise constant weight function m0 can approximate a general weight func-
tion m.
We have assumed that m is Lipschitz continuous with constant L, which
is a relatively strong form of function uniform continuity. In order to com-
pare a piecewise constant weight function m0 with a general weight function
m, we construct m0 (x) = m (θk) for x ∈ [θk, θk+1) for k = 1, . . . , K − 1.
With this construction, we can also show that any utility function could
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be approximated by a piecewise linear one. The following proposition gives
an error estimate.
Proposition 4.3.1. For  > 0 such that maxi=2,...,K (θi − θi−1) < , we
have:
(i) ‖m−m0‖C(X ) < L.





− 1)0.5  L (xmax − xmin).
Proof. See Appendix C.
The preceding result shows that we could approximate a general weight
function with a piecewise constant one. Note that it is not always the case
that Uw (m, ε) ⊂ Uw (m0, ε) in general, since m0 ≥ m by our construction.
However, since m0 ≥ m, for any u ∈ Uw (m, ε) there exists a uˆ ∈ Uw (m0, ε)
with uˆ ≥ u.
4.3.3 Robust certainty equivalent maximization prob-
lem
So far we have discussed the optimization framework which introduces
stochastic dominance relationships. All of them require a given bench-
mark by which the desired prospect depending on our decisions should
dominate. Armbruster and Delage (2015) proposes the concept of robust
certainty equivalent which removes the need of a benchmark.
We briefly comment on the robust certainty equivalent (RCE) for G.
The certainty equivalent is the amount for sure such that one would be
indifferent between it and the random prospect:
Cu [G (z)] , sup {s : u (s) ≤ E [u (G (z))]} , ∀u ∈ U .
Since we do not know the exact utility functions but a prevalent class of
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utility functions, we adopt the worst-case utility function for convenience,






Cu [G (z)] . (4.15)
Problem (4.15) avoids the difficult problem of constructing a benchmark
as in stochastic dominance constraints.
A big advantage of the formulation of robust certainty equivalent is that
it avoids the difficult problem of constructing a benchmark as in stochastic
dominance constraints. The choice of a benchmark is not trivial to make
and remains an interesting topic to explore. So far we do not have reason-
able guidance in constructing a benchmark, in particular, for different risk
preferences. Therefore, it is natural that we aim at the highest amount
of guaranteed return. Unlike utilities that can be scaled arbitrarily, this
measure has a meaningful set of units.
Now we discuss the shape of our formulation. A function f : Rn → R
is called quasiconcave if its domain and all its super-level sets
Sξ = {x ∈ dom f | f(x) ≥ ξ} , ∀ξ ∈ R,
are convex. We have the following lemma on the objective of Problem
(4.15).
Lemma 4.3.3. z → infu∈U Cu[G (z)] is quasiconcave.
Proof. Since all u ∈ U are increasing and concave, the function z →
u ([G (z)] (ω)) is concave as the composition of the increasing concave func-
tion u with the concave function [G (z)] (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. Then
E [u (G (z))] =
∑
ω∈Ω
P ({ω})u ([G (z)] (ω))
is concave as the nonnegative sum of concave functions. We know that
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Cu [G (z)] ≥ t is equivalent to E [u (G (z))] ≥ u(t) and therefore Cu [G (z)]
is quasiconcave in z. Thus, the point-wise infimum infu∈U Cu [G (z)] is
quasiconcave in z with infu∈U Cu [G (z)] ≥ t.
When U = Uw (m0, ε), the optimal value of Problem (4.15) under
WRASD is greater than t if and only if the constraint
ψ (G (z) ; Uw (m0, ε) , t) ≥ 0
has a feasible solution in z ∈ Z because infu∈Uw(m0, ε)Cu [G (z)] ≥ t is
equivalent to ψ (G (z) ; Uw (m0, ε) , t) ≥ 0. Therefore, we can solve Prob-
lem (4.15) with binary search via a series of feasibility problems like
max
z∈Z
{0 : ψ (G (z) ; Uw (m0, ε) , t) ≥ 0} . (4.16)
It can be shown that the cut generation problem ψ (X; Uw (m0, ε) , t)
in Problem (4.16) can be given by the optimal value of the following linear
programming problem:
min
v, s, a, b
∑
ω∈Ω
P ({ω}) (aωX (ω) + bω)− t











βk, ∀k = 1, . . . , K − 1.
The last constraints correspond to the weight function in the definition of
Uw (m0, ε).
In fact we aim to find out the value of t such that ψ (X; Uw (m0, ε) , t) =
0, which is the worst case. To solve Problem (4.16), we compute the dual
of ψ (G (z) ; Uw (m0, ε) , t) (which is a linear programming problem) which
then gives a system of convex inequality constraints. Then we can combine
this dual problem with our original problem and we have the following
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theorem.
Theorem 4.3.3. (i)Problem (4.16) is equivalent to
max
























− 1t (θk) + λk−1 − λk +
∑
ω∈Ω
δkω = 0, ∀k = 1, . . . , K,
(4.19)
− λk (θk+1 − θk) + µk−1 − µk − γlk + γuk ≥ 0, ∀k = 1, . . . , K − 1,
(4.20)
P ({ω}) [G (z)] (ω)−
K∑
k=1




δkω = 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω, (4.22)
(ii) Problem (4.17) - (4.22) is a convex optimization problem.
The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 4.3.2, which can be seen
in Appendix C.
By Problem (4.17) - (4.22), we can conclude whether the RCE of prospect
G(z) depending on our decision is less than the given t or not. If there is
a feasible solution, then the RCE of G(z) is greater than or equal to the
value of given t; if there is no solution, then the RCE of G(z) is less than
the value of given t.
In order to figure out the worst case of RCE, we require that the differ-
ence of the expected utility of the random prospect and the value of t be
small enough. Thus we apply a binary search method. We summarize the
binary search algorithm next.
Theorem 4.3.4. Suppose that Problem (4.6) - (4.8) is feasible. Algorithm
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1 finds a robust certainty equivalent t¯ = t1+t2
2
of X such that |t¯− t∗| < ζ in
at most O (log (1/ζ)) computations of ψ (X; Uw (m0, ε) , t), where t∗ is the
true robust certainty equivalent of X.
input : A routine that solves model optimally and ζ > 0.
output: t1+t2
2
Step1: Set t1 := τ1 and t2 := τ2;
Step2: If t2 − t1 < ζ, stop. Output: t1+t22 ;
Step3: Let t := t1+t2
2
. Solve Problem (4.16) by Problem (4.17) -
(4.22);
Step4: If ψ (G (z) ; Uw (m0, ε) , t) ≥ 0 is feasible, update t1 := t.
Otherwise, update t2 := t;
Step5: Go to Step 2.
Algorithm 1: Binary search
Proof. It can be noted that every loop in Algorithm 1 reduces the gap
between t1 and t2 by half. We now show the correctness of the binary
search. Note that ψ (G (z) ; Uw (m0, ε) , t) is non-increasing in t. If
ψ (G (z) ; Uw (m0, ε) , t) ≥ 0,
then t ≤ t∗; otherwise, we have t∗ < t; we always have t1 < t∗ < t2. It
follows that t¯ = t1+t2
2
is close enough to t∗ after sufficiently many loops.
4.4 Examples
4.4.1 Portfolio optimization problem with WRASD

















≥ E [u (Y )] , ∀u ∈ Uw (m, ε)
}
.
We consider a simple portfolio consisting of two stocks. In addition, a
bond fund will be used as the benchmark. Their returns are listed in Table
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4.2 with G (z) = R1z1 +R2z2 and E [G (z)] = 0.113z1 + 0.105z2.
Table 4.2
Returns of two stocks and a bond fund.
Rate of return: r 5% 6% 7% 9% 11% 12%
Pr, (R1 = r) 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.9
Pr, (R2 = r) 0 0.1 0 0 0.9 0
Pr, (Y = r) 0 0 0.4 0.6 0 0
We formulate the cut generation problem ψ (G (z) ; Uw (m0, ε) , Y ) in
which Uw (m0, ε) is the set of all non-decreasing concave utility functions
with marginal utilities bounded by a piecewise constant weight function
m0 for any given 0 < ε < 0.5. In this example, we firstly assume m0
is constant, which reduces to the almost first-order stochastic dominance
(AFSD) proposed by Leshno and Levy (2002). Then we assume that the
piecewise constant values of m0 are obtained from the logarithmic utility
function (i.e. u(x) = log x) which is proposed in Tan (2015). According to
Theorem 4.3.2, we solve the portfolio optimization problem as ε changes.
The results are shown in Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8, respectively.
As can be seen in Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8, the vertical axis shows the
optimal weights for both assets (z∗1 , z
∗
2) and the horizontal axis denotes ε.
In Figure 4.7, it can be noted that when ε = 0.04, we have z∗1 = 0 and z
∗
2 = 1
and when ε = 0.057, we have z∗1 = 1 and z
∗
2 = 0. This is consistent with
the fact that R2 dominates Y by AFSD with ε > 0.04, and R1 dominates
Y by AFSD with ε > 0.057. When ε < 0.04, there is no AFSD relationship
and the problem is infeasible. In Figure 4.8, the solution pattern is similar
to that in Figure 4.7 except that the corresponding ε value for feasible
solutions becomes greater. This is because m0 imposes stricter restrictions
on the utility functions.
Therefore, neither R1 nor R2, nor the combination of R1 and R2 will
dominate the benchmark Y by the conventional stochastic dominance.
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Hence, our simple portfolio example is infeasible under conventional SD
constraints. However, the introduction of WASD constraints allows us to
obtain solutions that are reasonable in practice.
Fig. 4.7. m0 is constant.
4.4.2 Portfolio optimization problem with RCE
Now we provide an illustration example of the robust certainty equivalent
maximization problem. Suppose that there are assets i = 1, . . . ,m. The
random return rate for asset i is Ri, and the return rate for asset i on
ω ∈ Ω is Ri (ω). Let Z = {z ∈ Rm :
∑m
i=1 zi = 1, z ≥ 0} be the set of





We see that the mapping G (z) is linear in the sense that z →∑mi=1Ri (ω) zi
is linear for all ω ∈ Ω. We aim to find the combination of these assets with
the largest robust certainty equivalent. We consider the two stocks used in
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Fig. 4.8. m0 is obtained from the logarithmic utility function.
the previous example (i.e. Table 4.2).
We formulate the robust certainty equivalent maximization problem
maxz∈Z infu∈Uw(m0, ε)Cu[G (z)], where Uw (m0, ε) is the set of all nonde-
creasing concave utility functions with marginal utilities bounded by a
piecewise constant weight function m0 for any given 0 < ε < 0.5. Here
we assume that the piecewise constant values of m0 are obtained from the
CRRA utility function (see Example 4.2.1) as proposed in Tan (2015). We
solve the robust certainty equivalent maximization problem as ε changes
and risk aversion parameter α changes. In this solution, we choose ζ = 10−5
and a discretization of X with evenly spaced sub-intervals of 0.2. Figure 4.9
and Figure 4.10 show the optimal RCE and the optimal weights of assets
as ε changes by fixing α = 0.8, respectively. Figure 4.11 shows the optimal
RCE as α changes by fixing ε = 0.1. In this case where α is in the range
of [0.7, 0.9], we always have z∗1 = 0, z
∗
2 = 1.
It can be noted that RCE is a measure with a meaningful set of units,
unlike utility measures that can be scaled arbitrarily. In particular, we
57
note that RCE increases when allowable deviation from the reference utility
decreases (i.e., increasing ε). In addition, RCE decreases when degree of
relative risk aversion increases (i.e., increasing α).
Fig. 4.9. Optimal RCE solutions as ε changes.
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Fig. 4.10. Optimal weights as ε changes.




Dominance of the Maximum
Geometric Mean Portfolio in
the long run
5.1 Introduction
It has been proposed by many that an investor with a sufficiently long
horizon should adopt a maximum geometric mean (MGM) strategy, which
aims for maximal terminal wealth by investing in each period based on
the logarithm of returns (see Kelly (1956), Breiman (1960), and Markowitz
(1976)). In particular, it follows from the law of large numbers that a
MGM portfolio will almost surely outperform other portfolios in the long
run under mild conditions.
One of the main criticism of the “clear preference” for the MGM strat-
egy was raised by Merton and Samuelson (1974) who noted that the MGM
strategy does not maximize expected utility across all nondecreasing util-
ity functions, even in the long run. Levy (2016) attempted to address
this concern by showing that, in the long run, the expected utility of the
MGM portfolio is no less than the expected utility of all other portfolios
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under certain conditions. Namely, when (i) terminal wealth of portfolios
are log-normally distributed, (ii) geometric standard deviation of the MGM
portfolio is no less than geometric standard deviation of the other portfolios
and (iii) marginal utility is bounded.
For infinitely long investment horizons, it follows from the central limit
theorem that terminal wealth is lognormally distributed under mild con-
ditions. Furthermore, this assumption appears to be reasonable under a
sufficiently long investment horizon in practice. Based on the annual rates
of returns of various assets from 1926 to 2012, Levy (2016) observed that,
across a 20-year horizon or longer, deviation between the log-normal dis-
tribution and empirical distributions based on actual returns appear neg-
ligible.
The requirement for higher geometric standard deviation is more prob-
lematic as the terminal wealth of the MGM portfolio will almost surely be
greater than the terminal wealth of all other portfolios, and not just those
with smaller geometric standard deviation, in the long run. However, the
superiority of the MGM portfolio over portfolios with larger geometric stan-
dard deviation in the long run is not addressed by Levy (2016).
In addition, we believe that there is merit in relaxing the requirement for
bounded marginal utility. Although a case for bounded marginal utility was
presented in Levy (2016), we believe that there are cases where unbounded
marginal utility is reasonable. For example, since an investor who has lost
all capital is “out of the game”, it is reasonable to assume u′(w)→∞ when
w → 0.
In this chapter, we refine the argument presented by Levy (2016) re-
garding the superiority of the MGM strategy in the long run by relax-
ing the requirements of higher geometric standard deviation and bounded
marginal utility. In particular, we show that a higher geometric mean is
necessary and sufficient for log-weighted almost stochastic dominance and
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the MGM strategy is preferred by all investors whose utility function de-
viates marginally from the logarithm utility function. Furthermore, the
maximum allowable deviation increases in the investment horizon and is
unbounded.
In the following, the problem will be described in Section 5.2. The
main results by applying ASD relationship for log-normal distribution will
be presented in Section 5.3. We will conclude this chapter in Section 5.4.
5.2 Problem description
Let Xt denote the portfolio return (end of period value) in period t. For
an investment horizon of T periods, the terminal wealth of the portfolio
is WX(T ) = Π
T
t=1Xt. If each Xt is independent and follows a log-normal
distribution with parameters µX and σ
2
X , WX(T ) also follows a log-normal
distribution with parameters TµX and Tσ
2
X . Consider a second portfolio
with terminal wealth WY (T ) that is log-normally distributed with param-
eters TµY and Tσ
2
Y .
Assuming that µX , µY , σX and σY are finite, it follows from the law
of large numbers that the terminal wealth of the portfolio with higher
geometric mean will almost surely be greater (see Levy (2016) for details).
Stated formally, if µX > µY then:
P [WX(T ) > WY (T )]→ 1, asT →∞.
Here, we note that the assumption on log-normally distributed returns
is not particularly restrictive since it follows from the central limit theorem
that the terminal wealth distribution of both portfolios approach the log-
normal distribution in the long run, even if Xt and Yt are not log-normally
distributed.
Although the argument above appears compelling, Merton and Samuel-
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son (1974) noted that the preferred investment strategy of an investor with
iso-elastic utility is independent of the investment horizon and the MGM
strategy does not maximize the expected utility of investors under some
iso-elastic utility functions. Therefore, the MGM strategy does not domi-
nate under conventional stochastic dominance rules in the long run and it
is not immediately clear that the MGM strategy should be preferred.
Levy (2016) attempted to resolve this issue by proving that the expected
utility of a log-normally distributed prospect with higher geometric mean
and geometric standard deviation will be at least as large as the expected
utility of another log-normally distributed prospect in the long run under
bounded marginal utility. However, this does not explain why the MGM
portfolio is also preferred over portfolios with higher geometric standard
deviation and by investors with unbounded marginal utility. In the next
section, we explain why the superiority of the MGM strategy in the long
run is better explained via log-weighted almost stochastic dominance.
5.3 Main results
We begin by introducing the concept of weighted almost stochastic domi-
nance (WASD) proposed by Tan (2015). Let U denote the set of all differ-
entiable nondecreasing utility functions and U∗(m, ε) denote the set of all
differentiable nondecreasing utility functions whose marginal utility differs




− 1]0.5 for some constant ε ∈ (0, 0.5]:
U∗(m, ε) =
{















We note that m(t) is a nonnegative function that describes the marginal
utility of some canonical utility function, which U∗(m, ε) is constructed
around. For example, if the decision maker’s preference is described ap-






Tan (2015) showed that X dominates Y with (m, ε)-WASD if and only
if E[u(X)] ≥ E[u(Y )] for all u in U∗(m, ε). Since U∗(m, ε) increases as ε
decreases, a lower ε implies a higher maximum allowable deviation from
the canonical utility function such that preference for X over Y is clear.
Consider two random variables X and Y that are log-normally dis-
tributed with parameters µX , σ
2
X , µY and σ
2
Y .
Theorem 5.3.1. Suppose X ∼ lnN(µX , σ2X), Y ∼ lnN(µY , σ2Y ), µX > µY




















where φ = µX−µY|σX−σY | and erf(·) denotes the Gauss error function.
Theorem 5.3.1 highlights the set of utility functions such that X is















For any two portfolios with log-normal returns, one could easily determine
the largest U∗(1
t
, h(φ)) such that preference for the portfolio with higher
geometric mean can be guaranteed by computing h(φ). The corresponding
values of h(φ) for different φ are illustrated in Figure 5.1.
The following two propositions highlight that h(φ) decreases in φ and
approaches 0 as φ grows infinitely large.
Proposition 5.3.1. h(φ) is strictly decreasing in φ.
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Fig. 5.1. The relationship between h(φ) and φ.























































































































Proposition 5.3.2. limφ→∞ h(φ) = 0.
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Having obtained the results above, we are now ready to study the su-
periority of the MGM portfolio in the long run from the perspective of
WASD. Let WX(T ) denote the terminal wealth of the MGM portfolio at
period T where WX(T ) is log-normally distributed with parameters TµX
and Tσ2X . In addition, let WY (T ) denote the terminal wealth of another
portfolio at period T where WY (T ) is log-normally distributed with pa-
rameters TµY and Tσ
2
Y . Since the MGM portfolio has maximal geometric
mean, µX > µY .
If σX = σY , preference for WX(T ) over WY (T ) is clear as the former
dominates the latter with first-degree stochastic dominance (Levy, 1973).









TµX − TµY∣∣∣√TσX −√TσY ∣∣∣ =
√
T (µX − µY )
|σX − σY | .
Since φ increases with T , it follows from Proposition 5.3.1 that the max-
imum allowable tolerance from logarithm utility, such that there is clear
preference for WX(T ) over WY (T ), increases with T . Therefore, prefer-
ence for the portfolio with higher geometric mean becomes clearer as the
investor’s investment horizon increases.
Furthermore, since φ→∞ as T →∞, it follows from Proposition 5.3.2
that the maximum allowable tolerance is unbounded. Hence, the max-
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imum allowable tolerance from logarithm utility becomes infinitely large
as the investment horizon grows infinitely long. From the perspective of
log-weighted almost stochastic dominance, a higher geometric mean is nec-
essary and sufficient for clear preference across an infinitely long invest-
ment horizon, which is consistent with the observation that a portfolio
with higher geometric mean will almost surely have higher terminal wealth
in the long run.
5.4 Discussion
In this chapter, we address the gap between the preference for the MGM
strategy in the long run from the perspectives of the law of large numbers
and stochastic dominance. In particular, the former states that the MGM
strategy is almost surely to be better in the long run but preference for the
MGM strategy is unclear under conventional stochastic dominance rules.
Here, we explain why the clear preference for the MGM strategy in the
long run can be explained via log-weighted almost stochastic dominance.
Besides adding to the theoretic debate regarding the superiority of the
MGM strategy in the long run, this work also adds to the stochastic domi-
nance literature by providing additional support for the use of log-weighted
almost stochastic dominance to explain clear preferences between risky
prospects in practice for a wide range of decision makers. In particular,
log-weighted almost stochastic dominance can reveal the clear preference
for the MGM strategy in the long run but, as noted by Merton and Samuel-
son (1974), WASD based on other CRRA utility functions may not.
Finally, this work presents an alternative to the mean-variance frame-
work proposed by Markowitz (1952), which is often criticized for assump-
tions on normality and quadratic utility. In our work, we highlight that
a geometric-mean-geometric-standard-deviation framework is suitable for
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comparing between investments with log-normal returns, which is reason-
able for investors with a sufficiently long investment horizon. Here, we do
not assume that the utility of the decision maker follows any particular form
but only assume that it can be approximated by logarithm utility. One key
insight is that the maximum allowable deviation from logarithm utility can
be expressed as a function of the geometric mean and geometric standard
deviations of investments under consideration (see, Theorem 5.3.1). In par-
ticular, the greater the difference in geometric mean and the smaller the
difference in geometric standard deviation, the clearer the preference for







As reviewed in Section 3.3, we point out four aspects that our optimization
framework should take into account: multivariate prospects, preference un-
certainty, computational tractability, target-oriented measure. Specifically,
previous work that is pertinent to each area has been reviewed respectively.
It can be noted that risk-aware optimization is a highly developed field.
However, it is not easy to do risk-aware optimization in practice for models
that simultaneously address the above mentioned four considerations.
One of the difficulties lies in determining the risk preferences of the de-
cision maker. Here, we will offer intuitive frameworks for doing risk-aware
optimization that are easy to apply. All the prospects we consider in this
chapter are multivariate. Specifically, we aim to construct a set of appro-
priate risk measures that well characterizes possible decision-maker risk
preferences, and then construct a robust stochastic optimization problem
using this risk measure set. The set of risk measures should be carefully
chosen so that we can appeal to the special structure of convex interpolation
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problems to make our robust formulations computationally tractable.
In this chapter, we focus on scalar-valued risk measures (although the
inputs are multivariate). In particular, we look into two approaches: sub-
gradient characterization and acceptance set approach. In the subgradi-
ent characterization approach, the set of risk measures is constructed by
convex function interpolation as well as other conditions such as elicited
comparison information. Then we aim to minimize the worst-case of the
constructed risk measures. In the acceptance set approach, we aim to fig-
ure out the acceptance set which is determined by the elicited comparisons
of given prospects.
In the following, the preliminary will be provided in Section 6.2. The
two approaches that deal with the scalar-valued risk measures will be dis-
cussed in Section 6.3.
6.2 Preliminary
We define any mapping ρ : Ln → Rd as a risk measure where d ≤ n. When
d = 1, ρ is a scalar-valued risk measure. When d ≥ 2, ρ is a vector-valued
risk measure.
We define the following category of risk measures:
Ricx , {ρ : ρ is nondecreasing, convex, and ρ (0) = 0} ,
defined to be the set of all monotonic and convex risk functions such that
the risk of the zero portfolio is zero. Therefore, the risk measures in Ricx
possess the following two key properties:
• Convexity: ρ (λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ λ ρ (X)+(1− λ) ρ (Y ) for allX, Y ∈
Ln and λ ∈ [0, 1].
• Monotonicity: If X, Y ∈ Ln and X ≤ Y , then ρ (X) ≤ ρ (Y ).
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Now, we present several other conditions to be used in the construction
of our uncertainty sets:
• Positive homogeneity: If α ≥ 0 and X ∈ Ln, then ρ (αX) = α ρ (X).
Positive homogeneity is well studied for univariate risk functions, see
Ruszczyn´ski and Shapiro (2006). Notice that positive homogeneity
implies that ρ (0) = 0.
• Translation equivariance: If α ∈ R and X ∈ Ln, then ρ (X + α e1) =
ρ (X) + α. We define
Req , {ρ : ρ (X + α e1) = ρ (X) + α} .
Translation equivariance is also well studied for univariate risk func-
tions, where we modify the definition for multivariate risk functions.
• Normalization: For fixed W0, Y0 ∈ Ln, ρ (W0) − ρ (Y0) = 1 (e.g. we
can take W0 = 1 and Y0 = 0). We define
Rnor , {ρ : ρ (W0)− ρ (Y0) = 1} .
We include normalization to avoid risk measures which take arbitrar-
ily large values, which incurs difficulties for our upcoming optimiza-
tion problems. In implementation, we often take W0 = 1 and Y0 = 0
to require that ρ (1) = 1.
• Elicited preference: Given a finite collection of pairs of random vec-
tors Wk, Yk ∈ Ln indexed by K, ρ (Wk) ≤ ρ (Yk) for all k ∈ K. We
define
Relc (Σ) , {ρ : ρ (Wk) ≤ ρ (Yk) ,∀k ∈ K} withΣ , {(Wk, Yk)}Kk=1 .
Preference elicitation is explored for expected utility and univariate
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risk functions in Armbruster and Luedtke (2015) and Delage and Li
(2015). Its extension to the multivariate setting is quite natural.
6.3 Problem formulations
Suppose we have a random variable G(z) defined in Section 2.1. In this
chapter, we consider G(z) as loss. Given a risk function ρ : Ln → R,
ρ (G (z)) is a measure of the fitness of G (z), where lower values of ρ (G (z))
are preferred. The corresponding risk-aware optimization problem is
min
z∈Z
ρ (G (z)) . (6.1)
Problem (6.1) is the main object of attention in this paper. Next, we give
conditions for Problem (6.1) to be a convex optimization problem.
Proposition 6.3.1. Suppose ρ ∈ Ricx, and that assumptions A1 and A2
hold. Then Problem (6.1) is a convex optimization problem.
Proof. We need only to show that z → ρ (G (z)) is convex since Z is a
convex set by assumption. Choose z1, z2 ∈ Z and λ ∈ [0, 1] and compute
ρ (G (λ z1 + (1− λ) z2)) ≤ ρ (λG (z1) + (1− λ)G (z2))
≤ λ ρ (G (z1)) + (1− λ) ρ (G (z2)) ,
where the first inequality follows by convexity of G and monotonicity of ρ,
and the second inequality follows by convexity of ρ.
Next we give several specific examples of risk functions to better moti-
vate Problem (6.1).
Example 6.3.1. For a utility function u : Rn → R , the expected utility
ρ (·) = E [u (·)] is a risk measure. This is closely related to the theory of
stochastic dominance that we have discussed in Chapter 4.
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Example 6.3.2. For the univariate case, the conditional value-at-risk with
the form of φα (X) = infη∈R
{
η + (1− α)−1 E [(X − η)+]} is a risk measure
on L.
Example 6.3.3. For n ≥ 1, we let F be a collection of convex functions
g : Rn → R. Then ρ : Ln → R defined by ρ (X) = supf∈F E [g (X)] is a
convex function on Ln since the supremum of convex functions is convex.
We emphasize that Problem (6.1) requires exact specification of the
decision maker’s risk preferences via the risk function ρ. However, this
information is difficult to elicit in practice. In this subsection we propose a
family of uncertainty sets for the decision maker’s risk preferences. Then,
we propose a robust optimization problem over this uncertainty set and
show how to reformulate it as a tractable convex optimization problem.
We are interested in the risk measures in Ricx. It is reasonable to
restrict to monotonic risk functions since greater loss should be associated
with greater risk. The requirement of convexity is also reasonable for our
setting since diversification should not increase risk.
We will use the notation R ⊂ Ricx to denote an uncertainty set of
risk functions. We will consider more restrictions on R later. The robust





ρ (G (z)) . (6.2)
which minimizes the worst-case risk over the uncertainty set R. Problem
(6.2) can be interpreted as being robust against uncertainty in the decision
maker’s risk preferences. This type of robust formulation was proposed
for the univariate case in Delage and Li (2015), while now we extend this
framework to the multivariate case.
Next we establish convexity of Problem (6.2).
Proposition 6.3.2. Suppose assumptions A1 and A2 hold, and R ⊂ Ricx,
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then Problem (6.2) is a convex optimization problem.
Proof. For any ρ ∈ R, each z → ρ (G (z)) is convex since
ρ (G (λ z1 + (1− λ) z2)) ≤ ρ (λG (z1) + (1− λ)G (z2))
≤ λ ρ (G (z1)) + (1− λ) ρ (G (z2)) ,
for all z1, z2 ∈ Z and λ ∈ [0, 1], where the first inequality follows from
convexity of G and monotonicity of ρ, and the second inequality follows by
convexity of ρ. Then, we see that z → supρ∈R ρ (G (z)) is convex since the
supremum of convex functions is convex.
6.3.1 Subgradient characterization
Next, we discuss tractable reformulations of the robust optimization Prob-
lem (6.2) for various uncertainty sets R. The key to the following devel-
opment is found in Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004), Subsection 6.5.5 (for
example) which shows that interpolation problems with convex functions
can be solved with convex optimization. This observation allows us to solve
Problem (6.2) with convex optimization techniques.
Again, Assumptions A4 and A5 also hold here. They vastly simplify
our development. For the benchmark, we can meet Assumption A5 by
construction since the benchmark Y is user input. The discretization Θ is
also user input, and it can be constructed a priori to include the support
of Y .
Since Ω is finite, we identify a random variables X ∈ Ln with a vector
X (ω) ∈ Rn |Ω| where we list the realizations of X component-wise. We
define






to be the union of the supports of random vector X,
⋃
k∈K {Wk, Yk}, and
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the origin. Since Ω is finite, the set Θ is finite as well.
For the robust optimization problem, the general scheme is as follows
with two stages:
1. Take the dual of the inner maximization in Problem (6.2) to obtain
a minimization problem
2. Amalgamate the two minimization objectives to obtain a single min-
imization problem
When the inner maximization in Problem (6.2) can be written as the
linear programming problem
max {〈f (G (z)) , x〉 : Ax ≥ b}
with dual
min {〈b, p〉 : A∗p ≤ f (G (z))}





{〈b, p〉 : A∗p ≤ f (G (z))} ≡ min
z∈Z, p
{〈b, p〉 : A∗p ≤ f (G (z))} ,
which is a convex optimization problem.
Likewise, we could use the interpolation techniques in Chapter 4 to
cope with the inner maximization in Problem (6.2). However, we make
two changes here: the functions that are interpolated here are convex, and
the prospects we are interested in are multivariate. The main two steps for
the linear interpolation technique here are as the following:
1. Determine the values of ρ (θ) on the finite set Θ for k = 1, . . . , K.
2. Interpolate to obtain the worst-case risk over the uncertainty set.
We introduce the following decision variables:
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• sθ be the subgradient of ρ at θ for θ ∈ Θ.
• tθ be the intercept of ρ at θ for θ ∈ Θ.
The following lemma is a necessary condition for a piecewise linear ρ to
lie in Ricx. With this result, the first step above mentioned is done. The
values of ρ on the finite set Θ can be determined.
Lemma 6.3.1. (i) Let ρ ∈ Ricx, then there exist {sθ}θ∈Θ ⊂ Rn |Ω|+ and
{tθ}θ∈Θ ⊂ R such that
ρ (θ) = 〈sθ, θ〉+ tθ, ∀θ ∈ Θ,
ρ (θ′) ≥ 〈sθ, θ′〉+ tθ, ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, θ 6= θ′.
(ii) Given {sθ}θ∈Θ ⊂ Rn |Ω|+ and {tθ}θ∈Θ ⊂ R, define
ρ∗ (x) = max
θ∈Θ
{〈sθ, x〉+ tθ} ,
then ρ∗ ∈ Ricx.
Proof. See Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004), Subsection 6.5.5. It can be
noted that the subgradients for all ρ ∈ Ricx are finite on conv {Θ} . Specif-
ically, at all x ∈ conv {Θ} there are sx ∈ Rn |Ω|+ and tx ∈ R such that
ρ (x) = 〈sx, x〉+ tx and ρ (y) ≥ 〈sx, y〉+ tx, ∀y.
Given a set of values {ρ (θ)}θ∈Θ where ρ ∈ Ricx, the next lemma con-
structs the largest increasing convex function ρ∗ with ρ∗ (θ) ≤ ρ (θ) for all
θ ∈ Θ.
Lemma 6.3.2. Let ρ ∈ Ricx, and define
ρ∗ (x) , max
a≥0, b
〈a, x〉+ b
s.t. 〈a, θ〉+ b ≤ ρ (θ) ,∀θ ∈ Θ.
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i) ρ∗ is increasing and convex.
ii) ρ∗ is equal to ∞ outside conv {Θ} ∪ Rn |Ω|− .
iii) If ρ¯ is another increasing convex function with ρ¯ (θ) ≤ ρ (θ) for all
θ ∈ Θ, then ρ¯ ≤ ρ∗.
Proof. i) The function ρ∗ is increasing and convex as it is the supremum of
increasing linear functions. It is also immediate that ρ∗ (θ) = ρ (θ) for all
θ ∈ Θ.
ii) In the domain where it is outside conv {Θ}∪Rn |Ω|− , since we maximize
on a such that a ≥ 0, we will have a→∞ which results in ρ∗ →∞.
iii) Moreover, ρ∗ ≥ ρ¯ for any ρ¯ ∈ Ricx with ρ¯ (θ) ≤ ρ (θ) for all θ ∈
Θ. We see that the epigraph of ρ∗ is by definition the intersection of the
epigraphs of all ρ¯ ∈ Ricx with ρ¯ (θ) ≤ ρ (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
We now proceed to discuss the specifics of the construction of the un-
certainty set R. We begin by identifying some desirable properties of risk
functions that should belong to this set. We already discussed the mono-
tonicity and convexity in the previous section, since these conditions are
necessary for Problem (6.1) to be convex. Now, we present several other
conditions to be used in the construction of our uncertainty sets:
We are interested in the set of risk measures R1 = Ricx ∩ Rnor ∩ Relc.
We introduce decision variables s =
(
sθ ∈ Rn |Ω|
)
θ∈Θ, t = (tθ ∈ R)θ∈Θ, a ∈
Rn |Ω|, and b ∈ R.
Theorem 6.3.1. Fix X ∈ Ln, then supρ∈R1 ρ (X) is equal to the optimal
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value of the following linear programming problem:
sup
a, b, s, t
〈a, X〉+ b (6.3)
s.t. 〈sθ, θ′〉+ tθ ≤ 〈sθ′ , θ′〉+ tθ′ , ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, θ 6= θ′, (6.4)
〈a, θ〉+ b ≤ 〈sθ, θ〉+ tθ, ∀θ ∈ Θ, (6.5)
〈sθ, θ〉+ tθ ≤ 〈sθ′ , θ′〉+ tθ′ , ∀θ ∈ {Wk} , θ′ ∈ {Yk} , (6.6)
〈sθ, θ〉+ tθ = 0, θ = 0, (6.7)
〈sθ, θ〉+ tθ − 〈sθ′ , θ′〉 − tθ′ = 1, θ = W0, θ′ = Y0, (6.8)
sθ ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ, (6.9)
a ≥ 0. (6.10)
If Problem (6.3) - (6.10) has an optimal solution
(
aˆ, bˆ, sˆ, tˆ
)
, then
ρˆ (X) = 〈aˆ, X〉+ bˆ
is the value of the worst-case risk measure of X.
Proof. Constraints (6.4) and (6.8) ensure that ρ (θ) takes the values of a
risk measure in Ricx evaluated on Θ by Lemma 6.3.1. Constraint (6.5)
ensures that we find out the worst-case risk measure in Ricx evaluated on
Θ by Lemma 6.3.2. Constraint (6.6) requires that ρ (θ) takes the values of
a risk measure in Relc. Constraint (6.7) require the risk measure takes the
values of a risk measure in Rnor.
The preceding proposition allows us to compute the worst-case risk
by solving a linear programming problem. Next we aim to optimize over
the decision set and turn attention back to Problem (6.2). We introduce
decision variables α = (αθ,θ′)θ,θ′∈Θ, θ 6=θ′ ∈ R|Θ|(|Θ|−1), β = (βθ)θ∈Θ ∈ R|Θ|,
γ = (γθk)k∈K ∈ R|K|, δ, ε ∈ R and z. Then Problem (6.2) is equivalent to a
convex optimization problem by the following theorem.
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Theorem 6.3.2. Problem (6.2) is equivalent to
min




























+ δθ1 {θ = 0}+ εθ1 {θ = W0} − εθ1 {θ = Y0}〉 ≥ 0,























+ δ1 {θ = 0}+ ε1 {θ = W0} − ε1 {θ = Y0} = 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ,
∑
θ
βθθ −G (z) ≥ 0,∀θ ∈ Θ,
∑
θ
βθ − 1 = 0,
α, β, γ ≥ 0.
The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 4.3.2, which can be seen in Appendix B.
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6.3.2 Acceptance set approach
An alternative way of defining risk measures is provided by the notion
of acceptance set, that is, the set of random variables X ∈ Ln which
are considered risk free by decision makers. In this subsection, we be-
gin by defining the acceptance set for scalar-valued risk measures with
multi-variate prospects. Then, we propose a tractable convex optimization
problem showing how to solve Problem (6.1) by the acceptance set method.
In Jouini et al. (2004), they proved a representation result for the risk
sets which have monotone, homogeneous, translation invariant and substi-
tutability properties. We start with the definition of acceptance set.
Definition 6.3.1. An acceptance set for scalar-valued risk measures with
multi-variate prospects is a closed convex cone A of Ln, containing Ln(H),
and such that R × {0}n−1 6⊂ A. Here, Ln(H) denotes the linear space of
essentially bounded H-valued B-measurable random vectors.
Intuitively, the elements in the set A are considered acceptable because
no additional capital is required in order to be risk free.
In Burgert and Rschendorf (2006), given an acceptance set A we can
define a corresponding risk measure
ρA (X) = inf {m ∈ R : X +me1 ∈ A} ,
which is convex when A is convex. Here X + me1 denotes that all the
realizations of the first entry in X are added by m. In this case, the set of
all convex risk measures can be denoted as Ricx∩Req. We will similarly use
the notation R ⊂ Ricx∩Req to denote an uncertainty set of risk functions.
In this case, we think that investors are able to aggregate their port-
folios to the first position. In order for a risky random vector X to be
acceptable in terms of risk, the decision maker determines that some de-
terministic capital m should be added to the first position. We say that
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this deterministic capital m cancels the risk induced by X if X + me1 is
acceptable by decision makers in the sense of the risk measure. The risk
measure of X will be the lowest amount of such deterministic m.
Using this representation, we can adapt the worst-case acceptance set
approach from Delage and Li (2015). In particular, the worst-case risk
measure is of the form
%R (X) = sup
A:ρA∈R
inf {m ∈ R : X +me1 ∈ A} .
This worst-case risk measure obtains the greatest value of deterministic
capital that would be required to make X risk free. Since we are interested
in convex risk measures, the good thing here is that the worst-case risk
measure can be equivalently considered as looking for a worst-case accep-
tance set A such that ρA = %R. It follows that we are going to construct an
acceptance set A effectively. It can be noted that the larger the acceptance
set A is, the smaller the value of m will be. Therefore, the worst-case accep-
tance set A should be the smallest convex set that covers all the acceptable
points.
Meanwhile, we still consider the elicited comparison information. Given
a finite collection of pairs of random vectors Wk, Yk ∈ Ln indexed by K,
we define a set of the risk measures revealing these elicited comparisons:
Relc (Σ) = {ρ (Wk) ≤ ρ (Yk) for all k ∈ K} with Σ , {(Wk, Yk)}Kk=1. In
particular, we start with a special case of risk measures R2 = Ricx ∩Req ∩
Relc (Σ0) with Σ0 , {(Wk, 0)}Kk=1. In addition, we list the realizations of X
component-wisely. Therefore, we consider X ∈ L with a vector (X (ω)) ∈
Rn |Ω|. We show in this case how supA: ρA∈R ρA (X) can be solved by linear
programming.
Proposition 6.3.3. Given a set of acceptable random payoffs {Wk}Kk=1
and any random payoff G(z), the value supA: ρA∈R2 ρA (G(z)) with Σ0 ,
83









θk ≥ 0, ∀k,
where m ∈ R, θ ∈ RK.
Proof. Following Burgert and Rschendorf (2006), all convex risk measures
can be equivalently defined in terms of acceptance sets. We thus focus on
the set of acceptance set candidates
A := {A : ρA ∈ R2} ,
and we wish to evaluate supA: ρA∈R ρA (X). We also introduce
A∗ :=
{
Z : ∃θ, Z ≥
K∑
k=1
θkWk, θ ≥ 0
}
.
We start by showing that A∗ ⊆ A for all A ∈ A. A∗ is the set of
points that dominate some convex combinations of the set 0 ∪ {Wk}Kk=1
and must therefore be included in any convex monotone set containing
0∪{Wk}Kk=1. Note that zero vector is implicitly acceptable since ρ (0) = 0.
It can be noted that for any two sets A1, A2 ∈ A, if A1 ⊆ A2, then
ρA1 (G(z)) ≥ ρA2 (G(z)). Therefore, ρA∗ (G(z)) ≥ supA∈A ρA (G(z)).
We then show that A∗ ∈ A. In other words, we verify that: a) A∗
contains the points {Wk}Kk=1; b) A∗ is convex and monotone; c) ρA∗ (0) = 0.
a) can be seen by the definition of A∗.
For b), given X1, X2 ∈ A∗, we have two convex combinations ζ1 and ζ2




iWk when j = 1, 2. Therefore, given any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
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we have
αX1 + (1− α)X2 ≥ α
K∑
k=1








αζ1i + (1− α) ζ2i
)
Wk,
thus αX1 + (1− α)X2 ∈ A∗. Also, given X1 ∈ A∗, there exists a convex




iWk. With the same ζ
1, for any




iWk and X2 ∈ A∗.
For c), by construction ρA∗ (0) ≤ 0 since 0 ∈ A∗. Also, since A∗ ⊆ A
for all A ∈ A, then ρA∗ (0) ≥ ρA (0) = 0.
Since A∗ ∈ A, then ρA∗ (G(z)) ≤ supA∈A ρA (G(z)). Therefore,
ρA∗ (G(z)) = sup
A∈A
ρA (G(z)) .
Fig. 6.1. Illustration of acceptance set method.
As shown in Figure 6.1, dark blue area is the convex hull of all the
acceptable points; light blue area is the acceptance set, which is the smallest
convex cone that contains all the acceptable points. Proposition 3.2 in
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Delage and Li (2015) shows a similar proof which covers the univariate
case. It is apparent to see the intuition here. The acceptable points are
determined by the elicited comparisons, that is, those prospects {Wk}Kk=1
with value greater than 0 are accepted. For all the candidate acceptance
sets corresponding toRicx∩Req and the above-mentioned acceptable points,
the worst-case acceptance set is the smallest monotone polyhedron that
contains the convex hull of all the acceptable points.
So far we have discussed the case where the acceptance set is determined
by the elicited comparisons between prospects and 0. A more practical and
interesting problem is when the elicited comparisons are made between non-
zero prospects. With the worst-case acceptance set method, we can extend
the results to this new case. The key thing here is still how to determine the
worst-case acceptance set based on the elicited comparisons. In particular,
we are interested in the set of risk measures R3 = Ricx ∩ Req ∩ Relc (Σ)
with Σ , {(Wk, Yk)}Kk=1. In addition, we still list the realizations of the
prospect component-wisely.
Proposition 6.3.4. Given a set of acceptable random payoffs {Wk, Yk}Kk=1
and any random payoff G(z), let {Xj}Jj=1 = 0∪{Wk, Yk}Kk=1 be the set of all
elements in the elicited comparisons and the zero prospect and we denote
it as X. The value supA: ρA∈R3 ρA (G(z)) with Σ , {(Wk, Yk)}Kk=1 and










θj ≥ 0, ∀j, (6.13)








s.t. δi ≤ δj, ∀(i, j) ∈ Σ¯ (6.15)
(Xi −Xj)Tyj + δie1 − δje1 ≥ 0, ∀i 6= j, (6.16)
θj ≥ 0, ∀j, (6.17)
δ1 = 0, (6.18)
where each yj ∈ Rn and Σ¯ is the set of pairs in the partial ordering of
{Xj}Jj=1 described by the elicited comparisons:
Σ¯ := {(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}2 : (Xi, Xj) ∈ Σ}.
Since the proof is complicated, we just present the general idea and steps
here. A similar proof with details can be seen in Delage and Li (2015).
In order to prove the above mentioned proposition, we need the fol-
lowing three steps. Firstly, we need the fact that ρA(X, δ) (G(z)) is non-
decreasing in δ, where A (X, δ) represents the convex hull of all the points
{Xj + δj}Jj=1:
A (X, δ) =
{
Z ∈ Rn : ∃θ ∈ RJ , Z ≥
J∑
j=1
θj (Xj + δje1) , θ ≥ 0
}
.
Next, we need the fact that the problem maxδ∈∆
∑J
j=1 δj is equivalent
to Problem (6.14)-(6.18). In particular, let δ¯ ∈ RJ be its optimal solution,








It follows that for any prospect G(z), the worst-case risk measure of
G(z) in the set of R3 is the optimal value of the problem:
%R3 (G(z)) = max
δ∈∆
ρA(X, δ) (G(z)) ,
Together with the three steps, we can show that
max
δ∈∆
ρA(X, δ) (G(z)) = ρA(X, δ¯) (G(z)) .
The idea here is similar to the case where we make elicited comparisons
between prospects and 0. For a given prospect, the acceptance set in the
worst-case is determined by the set of the feasible risk values δ ∈ ∆ for
the prospects in the elicited comparisons {Xj}Jj=1. Then, the worst-case
risk measure is obtained by determining the monotone convex hull of the





The fundamental goal of this thesis is to build optimization frameworks for
decision makers with unknown preferences under different conditions. In
brief, we answer the questions raised in Section 1.2 as follows:
1. We have proposed a new SD relationship in which utility functions are
weighted against a reference utility for risk-averse decision makers.
2. We have developed an optimization framework that introduces a set of
constraints of the above mentioned stochastic dominance relationship.
3. We have extended the concept of ASD to log-normal probability
distributions and applied the results to mean-variance analysis and
MGM strategy.
4. We provided a more general optimization framework that considers
the four considerations we have mentioned.
In Chapter 4, we proposed weighted almost stochastic dominance for
risk-averse decision makers, which seeks to reveal unanimous preference
between two prospects by all decision makers with non-decreasing concave
utility function whose marginal utility does not deviate from the reference
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− 1). We also formulated our proposed WRASD in
the constraints of our optimization framework. Specifically, we introduced
a cut generation problem with linear programming and used piece-wise
linear utility functions by interpolation with monotone concave functions.
In addition, we imposed boundaries on the subgradients of utility functions
so that the deviation from the reference utility was limited. The optimal
solution of the cut generation problem could be derived by solving its dual
problem once. In our optimization framework of robust certainty equivalent
maximization problem, we solved a series of cut generation problems where
a scalar target was deemed the benchmark in each iteration. The robust
certainty equivalent solution was determined via a binary search. The
framework in this chapter is a non-parametric representation that leads to
efficient tractable linear programming.
In Chapter 5, we applied the concept of weighted almost stochastic
dominance to prospects with log-normal probability distribution. In par-
ticular, we addressed the gap between the preference for the MGM strategy
in the long run from the perspectives of the law of large numbers and SD.
Besides adding to the theoretic debate regarding the superiority of the
MGM strategy in the long run, this work also adds to the SD literature by
providing additional support for the use of log-weighted almost stochastic
dominance to explain clear preferences between risky prospects in practice
for a wide range of decision makers. This work also presents an alternative
to the mean-variance framework proposed by Markowitz (1952), which is
often criticized for assumptions on normality and quadratic utility. For in-
vestments with log-normal returns, which are reasonable for investors with
a sufficiently long investment horizon, we show that a geometric-mean-
geometric-standard-deviation framework is more appropriate.
In Chapter 6, we firstly proposed the subgradient characterization ap-
proach to tackle risk measures. The set of risk measures was constructed
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by convex function interpolation as well as subgradient characterization.
The ambiguity in risk preferences was tackled by the elicited comparison
information. Then we aim to solve the robust optimization problem by
minimizing the worst-case of the constructed risk measures. The accep-
tance set approach is an alternative technique. In this case, the set of risk
measures consists of the positions that could get rid of risk induced by
the prospect (i.e. to make it accepted) by adding to it. We showed that
the acceptance set is the smallest monotone polyhedron that contains the
convex hull of all the acceptable points.
So far we provided mathematical optimization models that could deal
with the ambiguity in risk preferences for decision makers. On the whole
some contributions have been achieved in this thesis. Nevertheless, some
further research is necessary to extend our work. Some possible topics for
future extension are as follows.
In Chapters 4 and 6, we restrict our attention to risk-averse decision
makers and the corresponding optimization problems that can be formu-
lated or approximately solved by LP models. The risk-averse restriction,
which corresponds to concavity in utility function and convexity in risk
measure, is reasonable for both explicit quantitative analysis and in real
life. In contrast, the LP model assumption is made from a computational
perspective. Hence, the extension from this LP model to more general and
complicated optimization models (e.g., nonlinear problems) could be one
of the future research directions. However, the computation and optimiza-
tion would be more difficult. As a result, new analytic or approximation
techniques are required for this extension.
In Chapter 5, we note that a relationship exists between the difference of
means and the difference of standard deviations when we compare two log-
normally distributed random variables. This relationship is useful when we
aim to choose the prospect that is not dominated by all other choices in a
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feasible set. Incorporating this constraint in the optimization model would
be of interest and significance. This will also provide a new perspective of
mean-variance analysis.
In Chapter 6, we restrict our interest in scalar-valued risk measures. It
is sometimes more natural to use vector-valued risk functions when dealing
with multivariate prospects (Ararat et al., 2014; Molchanov and Cascos,
2016). In the case of scalar-valued risk measures, we deem that investors
are able to aggregate the assets in their portfolio. However, it is not avail-
able for investors to aggregate the assets in their portfolio under some
circumstances. In addition, treating each asset in the portfolio and allocat-
ing reserves separately are not beneficial to the financial agents. Therefore,
it would be interesting to investigate vector-valued risk measures. The
assumption of convexity could ensure computational tractability.
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Proof of Theorem 4.2.1
Proof. Firstly, we show the necessity. For any differentiable real-valued
function u(x) and distribution FX(x), by applying integration by parts
twice:
E [u (X)] =
∫ xmax
xmin




u′ (ξ)FX (ξ) dξ












Define S1 = {x ∈ X | FX(x) > FY (x)} and denote the complement of
S1 as S
C
1 . Hence, for any u ∈ Uw (m, ε):











































[FX (η)− FY (η)] dη
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[FY (ξ)− FX (ξ)] dξ










[FY (ξ)− FX (ξ)] dξ











































[FY (η)− FX (η)] dη
)
(−u′′ (ξ)) dξ
is non-negative. Equation (A.2) follows because u is concave. Equa-









− 1)−0.5m (xmax). Equation (A.4) is true by assumption.
Next, we show sufficiency by contradiction. Suppose that E [u (X)] ≥
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[FY (t)− FX(t)] dt.
Consider a differentiable concave utility function u ∈ Uw (m, ε) such













− 1)0.5m (xmin)− (1ε − 1)−0.5m (xmax)
2δ















where [xm − δ, xm + δ] is a small neighborhood of xm = arg maxx∈[xmin, xmax]{∫ x
xmin
[FX (η)− FY (η)] dη
}
.
Using integration by parts, we obtain:




























[FX (η)− FY (η)] dη
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[FX (η)− FY (η)] dη
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[FX (η)− FY (η)] dη
}
+ o (δ)
Equation (A.5) follows from the fact that u′′ (x) = 0 for all x /∈ [xm − δ, xm + δ].














































[FY (t)− FX(t)] dt.
In addition, observe that o (δ)→ 0 when δ → 0. Therefore, E [u (X)] <
E [u (Y )] for a sufficiently small δ which contradicts our assumption that
E [u (X)] ≥ E [u (Y )] , ∀u ∈ Uw (m, ε).
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Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 4.3.2
Proof. (i) The function ψ (X; Uw (m0, ε) , Y ) is explicitly (recall v1 = 0)
min
v, s, a, b
∑
ω∈Ω
P ({ω}) (aωX (ω) + bω)− vt (B.1)
s.t. vk+1 = sk (θk+1 − θk) + vk, ∀k = 1, . . . , K − 1, (B.2)
sk ≥ sk+1, ∀k = 1, . . . , K − 2 (B.3)











βk, ∀k = 1, . . . , K − 1, (B.5)
a, s ≥ 0. (B.6)
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The Lagrangian for Problem (B.1) - (B.6) is









































































































The desired form of the dual follows, which we substitute into Problem
(4.5).
(ii) All of the terms in Problem (4.9) - (4.14) are linear except for the
objective E [G (z)] and the constraints P ({ω}) [G (z)] (ω)−∑Kk=1 θkδkω ≥ 0.




Proof of Corollary 4.3.1
Proof. (i) Follows immediately from the assumption of Lipschitz continuity
of m, for x ∈ [θk, θk+1) we have
|m0 (x)−m (x) | = |m (θk)−m (x) | ≤ L |x− θk| < L.

































− 1)−0.5m0 (x) ≤ u′ (x) ≤ (1ε − 1)0.5m0 (x) ,(
1
ε
− 1)−0.5m0 (x) , u′ (x) < (1ε − 1)−0.5m0 (x) ,(
1
ε
− 1)0.5m0 (x) , u′ (x) > (1ε − 1)0.5m0 (x) .
If we define uˆ (x) =
∫ x
xmin










Proof of Theorem 5.3.1
Proof. First, we present four technical lemmas which will be used in the
proof of Theorem 5.3.1.
Lemma D.1. For a normally distributed prospect with mean µ, standard
















































































































































σY − σX =
µX − µY
σX − σY . 
Lemma D.4. Suppose X ∼ N(µX , σ2X), Y ∼ N(µY , σ2Y ), µX ≥ µY and














where φ = µX−µY|σX−σY | and erf(·) denotes the Gauss error function.
Proof of Lemma D.4. Under the lemma conditions, there is exactly
one intersection point t0 =
µXσY −µY σX
σY −σX between F and G (Levy 2006).
Hence, there are the following two possible cases to consider:
• S1 = {t : −∞ < t ≤ t0}
• S1 = {t : t0 < t <∞}
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First, we consider the case where S1 = {t : −∞ < t ≤ t0}. It follows





































































































(µY − µX)erf (t) +
√






















(µY − µX)erf (t) +
√




















+ (µY − µX).
Equation (D.1) follows from Lemma D.2. The last equality follows from
the fact that limt→−∞ erf (t) = −1 and limt→−∞ et = 0.
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[G(t)− F (t)] dx


























[F (t)−G(t)] dt+ ∫
SC1

















































































































Equation (D.2) follows from the observation that erf(−t) = −erf(t).
Equation (D.3) follows from Lemma D.3 and the observation that σX > σY
when S1 = {t : −∞ < t ≤ t0}. When S1 = {t : −∞ < t ≤ t0}, it follows
from Equation 2.2 and Equation (D.3) that X dominates Y with (1, ε)-
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In a similar fashion, it can be shown that, when S1 = {t : t0 ≤ t <∞},




























Proof of Theorem 5.3.1. Since X ∼ lnN(µX , σ2X), Y ∼ lnN(µY , σ2Y ),
we have ln(X) ∼ N(µX , σ2X), ln(Y ) ∼ N(µY , σ2Y ). It follows from Lemma
















if and only if:
E[u(ln(X))] ≥ E[u(ln(Y ))],∀u ∈ U∗(1, ε),
which is equivalent to:







by setting v(t) = u (ln(t)) and invoking chain rule for computing the deriva-
tive of the composition of two functions.























is also necessary and sufficient for
(
1
t
, ε
)
-WASD.

113
114
